




Profit and Protection in EU Markets for Border Control
Submission to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR)




Tidlig version også kaldet pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Lemberg-Pedersen, M., & Hansen, J. R. (2020). Profit and Protection in EU Markets for Border Control:
Submission to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Aalborg
Universitet.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.



















Martin	 Lemberg-Pedersen,	 Johanne	 Rübner	 Hansen	 &	 Oliver	
Joel	Halpern	
2020	




















































































































































































































Through	 the	 cases	 of	 interoperable	 EU	 databases,	 like	 VIS,	 SIS	 and	 EES,	 and	 space-based,	
networked	 surveillance	 pursued	 under	 the	 EURUSOUR	 project,	 this	 report	




and	 instruments	 underpinning	 EU	 border	 control,	 the	 report	 links	 these	 tendenciesto	 the	
conjunction	 between	 EU	 institutions	 and	 private	 actors	 from	 the	 European	 security	
and	defence	sector.	It	examines	the	various	lobbying	strategies	and	forums	effectuated	by	actors	
on	the	market	for	EU	border	control,	and	how	it	connects	to	industrial	ambitions	of	widening	and	
standardized	 of	 future	 markets.	 It	 argues	 thatthe	 blurring	 of	 public	 and	 private	
interests	has	 transformed	many	aspects	of	EU	border	 control	 into	 increasingly	profitable	 sites	







involved	 in	 EU	 border	 infrastructures	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 strategy,	 planning,	 advisory	 input	 and	
technical	expertise,	but	also	as	product	suppliers	for	the	“end	users”,	that	is	the	EU	or	national	
agencies	 and	 bodies	 tasked	with	 border	 control.	 By	 comparison,	 voices	 stressing	 the	 need	 to	




















This	 report	 concerns	 the	 implications	 of	 public-private	 relations	 for	 EU	 border	 control	
infrastructures.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 European	 border	 control	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 growing	
number	of	public,	private	and	technological	discussions	and	initiatives	at	the	EU-level	connected	
to	practices	of	enforcement	and	infrastructures	of	border	control.	Some	are	physical,	like	border	
guards,	others,	 such	as	biometric	databases	 and	maritime	 surveillance	 systems	are	digital	 and	
technological.	 Dominant	 discourses	 typically	 depict	 border	 technologies,	 new	 security	 systems	
and	the	private	actors	developing	them	as	a	panacea	to	deal	with	irregular.	These		systems	are	
intimately	 linked	to	political	and	economic	 interests,	both	at	the	national	 levels	of	EU	Member	
States	 and	 within	 EU	 agencies	 and	 institutions.	 Taking	 this	 nexus	 of	 interests	 into	 account	 is	
emerging	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 complex,	 important	 and	 underexamined	 areas	 in	 European	
immigration	politics,	these	years.	Given	the	laudable	focus	of	the	United	Nations	Human	Rights	
Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	(OHCHR)	on	the	role	of	private	military	and	security	companies	
in	 immigration	 and	 border	management	 and	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 all	
migrants,	 this	 report	 attempts	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 larger	 developments	 and	 problems	 facing	 this	
policy	development.	It	is	based	on	the	premise	that	any	careful	analysis	of	EU	border	control	must	
take	into	account	the	political	economy	underpinning	border	control	technologies,	and	how	these	
and	 the	political	decisions	accompanying	 them	can	be	 shaped	by	other	actors	 than	 the	public	
bodies	and	institutions	of	the		EU	or	its	Member	States.		
A	sustainable	policy	on	migration	that	takes	into	account	the	safeguarding	of	fundamental	
rights	 must	 therefore	 acknowledge	 this	 supply-chain	 of	 border	 technologies,	 functions	 and	
infrastructures.	It	needs	to	consider	how	the	development	of	EU	border	control	also	happens	as	a	
result	 of	 how	 commercial	 actors	 position	 themselves,	 and	 are	positioned	by	policy-makers,	 as	
central	 nodes	 on	markets	 for	 EU	border	 control	worth	 billions	 of	 euro.	 Such	 a	 perspective	 on	
border	control	challenges	standard	assumptions	privileging	the	territorial	unit	of	the	nation-state,	
or	the	stated	self-image	of	the	EU	as	a	supranational	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(AFSJ).	
It	 amounts	 to	 an	 important	 decentring	 of	 the	 focal	 points	 determing	 how	 border	 control	 is	
analyzed,	as	it	does	not	limit	critical	scrutiny	to	the	dictates	of	national	or	EU	politicians,	but	also	
observes	how	commercial	actors	not	bound	by	the	same	rules	of	accountability,	are	increasingly	

















control	 by	 collecting	 and	 tracing	 contracts	 from	 the	 EU	 agencies	 and	 funding	 programme	 of,	
respectively,	 Frontex,	 EU-Lisa	 and	 Horizon	 2020,	 Research	 Framework	 Programmes	 and	 the	
Copernicus	Programme.	All	of	these	contracts	were	collected	in	an	Excel	database,	the	starting	
point	of	which	was	set	at	2007.		






the	 construction	 of	 several	 timelines	 visualizing	 the	 number	 of	 registered	 meetings	 between	
companies,	sectors	and	Commission	representatives	and	portfolios.	
	 Complementing	the	databases,	this	report	also	relies	on	open	source	data	from	publicly	
available	policy	documents,	policy	 reports,	 technical	 studies	and	cost	assessments.	These	have	
been	identified	in	particular	through	the	EU-portal	Cordis,	which	has	been	used	to	generate	all	
objective	 and	 project	 descriptions	 quoted	 about	 consortiums	 under	 FP7	 and	 Horizon	 2020.	
Moreover,	webpages	of	relevant	agencies	and	programmes,	such	as	Frontex,	EU-Lisa,	Copernicus,	
EUROSUR,	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	have	also	been	used.	Other	 sources	of	data	on,	 respectively,	
private	 interests	 in	EU	border	control	and	on	lobbyism	in	EU	institutions	 included	reports	from	
Statewatch,	 Stop	 Wapenhandel,	 and	 the	 Transnational	 Institute,	 as	 well	 as	 lobbyfacts.eu,	
Corporate	Europe	Observatory	and	Transparency	 International’s	 Integrity	Watch.	 Together,	 this	
allows	 for	 analyses	 in	 some	detail	 how	companies’	 impact	 the	 	policy-making	processes	of	 EU	
border	governance	and	how	this	connects	to	the	infrastructural	and	technological	development	
of	border	control.	























quantifiable,	 cross-institutional	 comparisons	 impossible.	 As	 of	 2019,	 the	 Commission,	 the	
European	Parliament	and	Council	were	still	negotiating	the	adoption	of	a	mandatory	transparency	
register	for	all	three	institutions	(Integrity	Watch,	2019).	Consequently,	while	the	report	does	not	
represent	 an	 exhaustive	 mapping	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 global	 or	 even	 EU	 border	
governance,	it	does	offer	an	illustrative	and	case-based	analysis	that	brings	crucial	questions	and	
criticisms	into	light,	contributing	new	knowledge	and	facilitates	attempts	by	civil	society	and	non-







sectors	 of	 biometrics,	 security,	 defence	 and	 aerospace,	 and	 their	 involvement	 in	 making	 a	








input	 as	 expert	 knowledge	 (Ibid.;	 Baird	 2018).	 These	 strategies	 are	 pursued	 in	 different	ways.	
Lobbyists	 may	 target	 the	 European	 Commission,	 responsible	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	 new	










and	medium-sized	 businesses	 (SMEs)	 who	 also	 reap	 smaller	 contracts	 concerning	 IT,	 housing,	
interpretation,	health,	cleaning,	layout/design,	software,	conference	and	meetings,	consultancies,	
maritime	or	aviation	services,	office	supplies	or	transportation.		



















universities	 and	 industry.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 Unit	 participates	 in	 numerous	 fairs,	 conferences,	
workshops	 and	 luncheons.	 Notably,	 it	 has	 participated	 in	 several	 EU	 expert	 forums	 alongside	
industry	 representatives.	On	 behalf	 of	 the	 Agency,	 the	Unit	 has	 also	 organized	 several	 border	







Agency’s	 function	as	one	of	 “following	up”	on	 research	 into	border	 control,	 the	new	mandate	
stated	that	it	should	“proactively	monitor	and	contribute	to	the	developments	in	research	relevant	
for	 the	 control	 and	 surveillance	 of	 the	 external	 borders”	 (EU	 Parliament,	 2011a).	 Moreover,	
Frontex	was	also	allowed	to	build	a	permanent	pool	of	equipment	itself	through	purchase	or	lease,	
Agency Year Contract	title Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)
Frontex 2018 Aerial	Surveillance Diamond-Executive	Aviation Surveillance 4.793.875,00












Frontex 2017 Aerial	Surveillance EASP	Air	BV Surveillance 2.145.525,00







































in	 EU	border	management	 since	2016	where	maritime	 rescue	operations	have	 gradually	 been	
replaced	 by	 aereal	 surveillance	 flights	 in	 the	 Mediterranean,	 and	 intelligence-sharing	 and	
collaboration	with	f.i.	Libyan	authorities	on	pulling	back	migrant	boats	to	Libyan	territory..		
As	mentioned,	 another	 big	 contractual	 thematic	 has	 been	 the	 organization	 of	 Frontex	
events,	workshops	and	conferences	outside	Poland	during	2017	(awarded	to	Adria	Congrex)	and	





















































all	 of	 them	 have	 been	 awarded	 to	 the	 same	 five	 companies,	 namely	 Atos,	 Safran,	 Accenture,	
Morpho	(subsidiary	to	Safran)	and	HP,	stands	out.	All	are	companies	operating	on	the	markets	of	







Horizon	2020	 is	 the	biggest	EU	R&D	 Innovation	programme	ever	with	nearly	€80bn	of	 funding	
available	between	2014-2020	(European	Commission,	2020a).	It	was	conceived	in	2011	in	line	with	
a	commitment	to	increase	EU	spending	on	R&D	to	3%	by	2020	(European	Commission,	2011e).	












































































China,	 Canada,	 Australia,	 South	 Africa,	 Brasil	 and	 Japan	 (Ibid.).	 Applications	 from	 entities	 in	
Belgium,	France,	the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg	and	Austria	were	the	most	successful,	with	more	
than	 one	 out	 of	 six	 applications	 being	 successful,	while	 applications	 from	 entities	 in	 Bulgaria,	
Slovenia,	Hungary,	Croatia	and	Latvia	were	 less	successful;	Bulgarian	proposals	were	successful	
less	 than	one	 time	 in	 ten	 (Ibid.).	 It	 transpires	 then,	 that	 the	 funding	has	 clustered	 in	 locations	
traditionally	associated	with	economic	power	in	Europe.	The	new	instrument	Horizon	Europe	is	
projected	to	start	in	2021	(European	Parliament	2019a)..	
Table	3	 visualizes	 the	10	 largest	 contracts	 awarded	by	 the	 EU-funded	Horizon	2020	 to	






Table	4	visualizes	 the	10	 largest	contracts	awarded	by	Copernicus	between	2014-2018,	 though	
apart	 from	one	 in	2016,	all	 those	shown	here	are	 from	2015.	All	 the	contracts	are	awarded	to	
companies	in	the	defence,	aerospace	and	biometrics	sector.	Thales	won	the	two	largest	contracts	
worth	over	€370m	combined,	though	the	four	next	largest	–	all	going	to	Astrium	–	have	a	similar	
combined	 value.	 Astrium	 and	 Ariane	 are	 both	 companies	 within	 the	 Airbus	 umbrella;	 taken	
together,	Airbus’	total	revenue	from	Copernicus	contracts	approached	€700m.	
	 The	 processes	 through	which	 this	multifaceted	market	 has	 evolved	 have	 included	 the	
blurring	of	boundaries	between	public	interests	and	institutions,	and	the	profit-driven	activities	of	
the	commercial	actors	 listed	above.	Of	particular	 interest	 in	this	regard	 is	 the	way	 in	which	EU	
research	funding	has	been	used	to	underpin,	diversify	and	grow	the	border	control	market	that	is	
restructuring	the	material	conditions	for	EU	border	control.	
4.2	 Industrial	 interests,	 research	 frameworks	 and	 horizons	 for	 border	
control		
Agency Year Contract	title Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)












































According	 to	 a	 2015-study	 contracted	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 conducted	 by	 Dutch	
consultancy	 company	 ECORYS,	 an	 “EU	 security	 industry”	 combined	 to	 generate	 an	 annual	
turnover	of	close	to	€200	billion	and	employing	nearly	4.7	million	people	(ECORYS,	2015).	Of	the	
seven	Member	States	surveyed	by	ECORYS,	the	midpoint	estimates	for	turnover	and	employment	
were:	 The	United	 Kingdom:	 €37,2	 billion/435.000	 people;	 France:	 €32	 billion/300.000	 people;	
Italy:	 €18,6	 billion/159.000	 people;	 Spain:	 €9,9	 billion/86.000	 people	 for	 Spain;	 Poland:	 €1,6	
billion/67.000	 people;	 Estonia:	 €1,3	 billion/14.000	 people.	 A	 strong	 correlation	 was	 observed	
between	 the	 estimated	 industry	 size	 and	 that	 of	 the	 national	 economies	 (Ibid.).	 ECORYS	 also	






technologies	 have	 dual,	 or	multiple,	 uses.	 Technologies	 purchased	 for	 one	 purpose	 (migration	
control)	may	also	be	repurposed	over	time	(population	control)	as	the	definitions	of	security	and	

















discourses	 linking	 together	 crime	 prevention,	 maritime	 or	 aviation	 security	 with	 the	 combat	
against	 irregular	migration.	And	 they	are	also	 facilitated	by	 the	aim	of	 technology	 suppliers	 to	
expand	market	shares	or	develop	new,	emerging	markets,	through	discourses	of	“dual	purposes”,	
“civilian	spill-over	effects”	and	the	need	to	resist	the	“fragmentation”	of	the	European	security	




security	market	 (Ibid.).	 For	 some	years	now,	 traditional	defence	 industrial	 conglomerates	have	






control	 (Jones,	 2016).	 Indeed,	 as	 Ben	 Hayes	 noted	 already	 in	 2006;	 “the	 security-industrial	
complex	 has	 developed	 as	 the	 traditional	 boundaries	 between	external	 security	 (military)	 and	
internal	security	(security	services)	and	law	enforcement	(policing)	have	eroded”	(Hayes,	2006).	
The	European	Commission	has	 invested	much	 in	 trying	to	create	a	common-European	security	
and	border	 industry.	 In	February	2004,	the	Commission	granted	€65	million	to	the	Preparatory	
Action	 for	 Security	 Research	 subsidizing	 39	 projects	 between	 2004	 and	 2006.	 In	 2007,	 the	
European	 Commission	 launched	 its	 first	 European	 Security	 Research	 Programme	 under	 the	
heading	of	“Secure	Societies:	protecting	freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	citizens	(European	
Commission,	2020b).	The	ESRP	followed	a	four-year	period	where	the	strategic	priorities	guiding	
the	 Research	 Programme	 had	 been	 developed	 through	 several	 Commission-initiated	 expert	
forums.	 These	 included	 the	 2003	 Group	 of	 Personalities	 (GoP),	 the	 2005	 European	 Security	
Research	Advisory	Board	(ESRAB),	and,	alongside	the	 launch	of	the	Research	Programme	itself,	
the	2007	European	Security	Research	 Innovation	Forum	(ESRIF).	Unlike	civil	 society	actors,	 like	
humanitarian	 NGOs,	 high-level	 representatives	 from	 the	 major	 actors	 of	 the	 European	 arms	
industry	were	granted	seats	on	all	of	the	forums.	Thus,	on	the	GoP	advising	on	the	future	priorities	
of	 the	 European	 Security	 Research	 Programme,	 the	 Commission	 had	 invited	 on	 board	
representatives	 from	 Airbus,	 Thales,	 BAE	 Systems	 and	 Finmeccanica,	 on	 the	 ESRAB	 sat	
representatives	from	Airbus,	Thales,	BAE	Systems,	Finmeccanica	and	Safran,	and	on	ESRIF	were	
representatives	from	Finmeccanica,	Airbus,	Safran	and	Thales.	Similarly,	for	the	development	of	
the	 EU’s	 Security	 Industrial	 Policy,	 announced	 in	 2012,	 were	 invited	 representatives	 from	
Finmeccanica,	Airbus	and	Thales.		
Besides	 the	 composition	 of	 each	 of	 these	 forums,	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 commercial	
interests	into	EU	policies	was	also	facilitated	by	the	fact	that	each	of	the	forums	recognized	and	
built	upon	the	recommendations	of	the	earlier	ones.	For	instance,	the	GoP	warned	that	"time	is	
of	 the	 essence.	 Europe	 needs	 to	 act	 quickly	 if	 it	 is	 to	 remain	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 technology	
research,	and	if	industry	is	to	be	able	to	exploit	the	results	competitively	in	response	to	the	rapidly	
emerging	 needs	 for	 sophisticated	 security-related	 products"	 (GoP,	 2003).	 Mirroring	 the	 GoP-
report,	ESRIF	also	emphasized	the	need	“to	bring	together	at	a	European	level	the	'demand'	and	
'supply'	sides	 in	order	to	 jointly	define	commonly	agreed	strategic	 lines	of	action	for	European	
security	research”,	and	to	 increase	support	for	technologies	that	the	actors	from	the	European	
security	and	defence	sector	was	itself	producing	and	selling,	such	as	surveillance	and	navigation	




surveillance	 activities”	 needed	 a	 technical	 framework	 capable	 of	 “considerably	 improve	 their	
situational	 awareness”.	 This	 awareness,	 the	 Forum	 continued,	 could	 require	 deployment	 of	
drones,	 biometrics,	 new	 technology	 radars	 and	 satellites	 (ESRIF,	 2009).	 In	 2007,	 following	 the	
ESRIF-recommendations,	a	common-European	ESRP	was	established	with	a	€1,4	billion	budget	









Aligned	 with	 the	 views	 of	 commercial	 security	 companies,	 this	 Communication	 also	
announced	a	dedicated	Security	Industrial	Policy,	which	was	duly	launched	in	a	Commission	Staff	
Working	Paper	in	2012	and	stated	that	“A	competitive	EU	security	industry	is	the	conditio	sine	qua	
non	 of	 any	 viable	 European	 security	 policy	 and	 for	 economic	 growth	 in	 general”	 (European	





checkpoints,	 fence	 and	 barrier	 hardware,	 border-perimeter	 people	 screening	 systems,	 border-
perimeter	 people	 and	 workforce	 biometric	 identification	 systems,	 and	 border-perimeter	
construction	projects	(Ibid.).	Although	later	disappointed	by	the	Commission’s	rejection	of	further	
increasing	the	subsidies	for	the	industry	(Jones,	2016),	at	the	time,	the	lobby	groups	of	the	border	







PASR.	 Of	 the	 European	 companies,	 Thales	 was	 the	 biggest	 beneficiary	 of	 FP7	 project	 funds,	
participating	 in	 97	 projects	 totalling	 €253,8	 million,	 Airbus	 and	 several	 of	 its	 subsidiaries	
participated	in	74	projects	worth	€37,6	million,	while	Telespazio,	the	joint	venture	between	Thales	
and	Finmeccanica,	harvested	€6,1	million	through	8	projects	(Kumar,	2017;	European	Commission,	
2011g).	After	2013,	 this	 trend	was	 continued	and	 indeed	expanded	when	 the	 seven-year	€1,7	
billion	 financing	 of	 the	 ESRP	 was	 continued	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 Horizon	 2020	 framework	
research	programme.		
Both	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	subsidized	a	variety	of	projects	concerned	with	the	research	
and	 development	 of	 EU	 border	 infrastructure.	 Figures	 1-3	 visualize	 the	 consortiums	 PERSEUS	
(FP7),	and	ARESIBO	and	PROTECT	(Horizon	2020),	illustrating	how	the	research	and	development	
of	 European	border	 control	 technologies	happens	 in	 close	 collaboration	between	 security	 and	
defence	companies,	universities	and	research	organizations	and	consultancy	firms.	The	Norwegian	
Institutt	 for	 Fredsforskning	 (Institute	 for	 Peace	 Research),	 for	 instance,	 is	 heavily	 involved	 in	
numerous	 collaborations	with	 the	military	 industry.	 And	 sometimes,	 academic	 institutions	 are	
coordinating	 such	 border	 security	 projects,	 like	 the	 University	 of	 Reading	 under	 the	 PROTECT	





























just	 in	 Horizon	 2020,	 a	 total	 of	 42	 consortiums	working	 on	 border	 control	 projects,	 narrowly	






of	 these	 practices	 are	 increasingly	 encouraged	 by	 university	 managements,	 in	 effect	 creating	



















the	€100	billion	 research	and	 innovation	programme	entitled	Horizon	Europe,	 to	 run	between	





and	 support	 the	 uptake	 of	 innovative	 solutions	 in	 industry	 and	 society	 to	 address	 global	
challenges”	(Ibid.,	p.	28)	A	programme	entitled	“inclusive	and	secure	societies”	is	to	realize	those	
ambitions	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 security	 industry,	 and,	by	 implication,	 also	 the	border	 control	
component	of	EU	border	control.	
4.2.1	Work	Programmes,	Advisory	Groups	and	Technology	Platforms		












market	 competitiveness	 otherwise	 invoked	 as	 justification	 for	 increased	 subsidies	 as	 it	 is	 pre-
empted	by	already-agreed	procurement	demands.	As	such,	while	heralded	as	innovation	by	the	





The	 members	 are	 allegedly	 sitting	 on	 AGs	 in	 their	 personal	 capacities,	 and	 not	 as	
representing	 organizations	 or	 countries.	 However,	 interested	 industry	 stakeholders	 are	 closely	
engaging	 with	 the	 groups	 either	 by	 approaching	 their	 members,	 or	 when	 representatives	 or	
former	employees	are	nominated	as	AG	members.	For	instance,	looking	at	the	members	of	two	
AG	 under	 FP7s,	 respectively	 for	 Space	 (SAG)	 and	 Security	 (SecAG),	 the	 distinction	 between	
members’	personal	and	professional	capacity	becomes	blurred	as	does	the	information	about	it.	
Thus,	one	section	the	Commission	website	(European	Commission,	2011f)	lists	members	like	Paul	
Kamoun	and	 Jean-Jacques	Tortora	as	 coming	 from,	 respectively,	 the	University	of	Nice-Sophia-
Antipolis	 and	 Eurospace.	 However,	 in	 the	 SAG’s	 own	 report	 (European	 Commission,	 2011a)	
Kamoun	is	listed	as	the	Chairman	of	the	ASD	working	group	on	GMES.	And	both	lists	fail	to	mention	
that	 Kamoun	was	 also	 Vice	 President	 for	 Thales	 Alenia	 Space	 at	 the	 time.	 Similarly,	 although	
Tortora	was	the	Secretary-General	of	Eurospace,	Eurospace	is	also	the	Space	group	of	the	ASD.	In	
2010,	 the	Security	AG	also	 listed	members	allegedly	sitting	 in	 their	personal	capacity,	but	who	
were	 nonetheless	 also	 representatives	 for	 companies	 like	 Cassidian	 (Jacqueline	 Argence),	
Finmeccanica	(now	Leonardo)	(Giovanni	Barontini),	Siemens	(Angelika	Staimer),	SAGEM/Morpho	
















they	“can	play	a	key	role	 in	better	 incorporating	 industry's	needs	 into	EU	research	priorities	by	





which	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 preparing	 the	 annual	 calls	 if	 endorsed	 by	 Programme	 Committees.	











border	 control	 had	 also	 featured	 explicitly	 as	 part	 of	 this	 argumentation,	 including	 some	
suggestions	 to	 raise	 the	 Commission-funding	 of	 the	 ETPs	 themselves	 from	 a	 50/50	 deal	 with	
industry,	to	75%	Commission	funds;	that	ETPs	should	be	“mission-oriented”	particularly	when	it	













control.	 Alongside	 its	 placement	 on	 the	 SecAG,	 the	 Agency	 would	 also	 play	 a	 larger	 role	 in	
developing	and	deciding	the	funding	streams	for	EU	research	programmes.	This	legislative	drive	




In	 2015,	 the	 ETPs	 were	 fused	 with	 European	 Industrial	 Initiatives	 and	 turned	 into	
European	Technology	and	Innovation	Platforms	(ETIPs)	(European	Parliament,	2017a).	Thirty-six	
ETPs	were	effective	under	Horizon	2020	 themes	decision	making,	 including	 Integrated	Mission	
Group	 for	 Security	 (IMG-S),	 the	 ASD,	 Big	 Data	 Value	 (BDV)	 and	 the	 European	 Cyber	 Security	
Organization	(ECS).	Among	these,	IMG-S	frames	itself	as	a	European	network	of	experts	in	security	
with	 230	members	 from	 119	 organizations	 across	 24	 countries.	 It	 has	 formed	 the	 Aerospace	















institutions	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	many	 tenders	 that	 companies	 pursue,	 and	 the	market	 for	




All	 of	 these	 sectors	 are	 characterized	 by	 complex	 forms	 of	 ownership,	 including	
conglomerates,	 joint	 ventures	 and	 SMEs.	 Several	 of	 the	 biggest	 corporate	 actors	 on	 this	
multisectoral	market	(see	Figure	6)	pursue	conglomerate	strategies	 involving	parent	companies	
and	multiple	 subsidiaries	 spread	 across	 several	 industries	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 their	 potential	




business	 and	 its	 speciality	 of	 biometric	 technology	 for	 governmental	 and	 commercial	 actors	
(Gemalto,	 2017).	 Likewise,	 Morpho	 was	 acquisitioned	 by	 Safran,	 but	 in	 2017	 Safran	 sold	 off	
Morpho,	which	then	merged	with	Oberthur	Technologies	and	created	OT	Morpho.	OT	Morpho	
was	then	shortly	after	renamed	Idemia.	The	multisectoral	market	for	border	control	thus	spans	




aircraft,	 helicopters,	 defence,	 space	 and	 innovation.	 These	 are	 then	 targeted	 by	 subsidiary	
companies,	 such	 as	 Airbus	 Helicopters,	 Airbus	 Defence	 &	 Space,	 ATR,	 Stelia	 Aerospace,	 Elbe	
Fluzeugwerke,	Airbus	 Corporate	 Jets,	 Airbus	Military,	 Panavia	Aircraft,	Helibras	 and	Airbus	UK.	
Similarly,	 Italian	 Leonardo	 also	divides	 its	 products	 into	 four	 divisions:	 Electronics,	 helicopters,	
aircrafts,	 aerostructures	 and	 cyber	 security.	 These	 are	 then	 targeted	 by	 subsidiary	 companies,	
including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 AugustaWestland,	 MBDA,	 ATR,	 Telespazio,	 Thales	 Alenia	 Space,	
Leonardo	US	Holding.,	SELEX	Galileo,	SOGEPA,	AugustaWestland	Holdings,	Selex	ES	International,	
Alenia	 Aermacchi,	 Sistemi	 Software	 Integrati,	 Finmeccanica	 UK,	 Finmeccanica	 Group	 Services,	
Finmeccanica	 Finance	Telespazio	Holding,	Dataspazio,	Datamat	 (Suisse),	 Leonardo	UK,	Ansaldo	
Argentina	S.A.,	Alenia	Hellas,	Selex	Sensors	and	Airborne	Systems,	to	name	but	a	few.	
Although	 public	 institutions	 are	 integral	 for	 the	 processes	 whereby	 the	 construction,	
maintenance	 or	 operation	 of	 border	 control	 infrastructure	 is	 researched,	 developed	 and	










a	 small	 handful	 of	 European	 companies	 stand	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 these	 large-scale	
infrastructural	projects.	These	companies	have	featured	on	multiple	levels	when	it	comes	to	EU	







cost	 of	 €734m	 (Akkerman,	 2016).	 Today,	 integrated	 border	 systems	 are	 just	 one	 area	 of	
specialization	 (Airbus,	2019b),	alongside	a	comprehensive	space	programme	with	a	number	of	
subsidiary	 companies	 including	 Ariane	 Space	 and	 Astrium	 GMBH.	 In	 2015	 alone,	 this	 set	 of	





for	 EU	 relations	 is	 the	 Senior	 Vice	 Preseident	 and	Head	 of	 Europe	 and	NATO	Affairs,	 Nathalie	






(Accenture,	 2019),	 the	 company	 has	 over	 450.000	 employees	 (Forbes,	 2019b).	 Accenture	 has	
















boasted	 revenues	 of	 $11,3bn	 and	 had	 122.000	 employees	 (Forbes,	 2019c).	 Atos	 entered	 the	
market	for	border	infrastructures	very	early,	as	it	was	responsible	for	the	development	of	the	first-






Commission	2019b).	 Since	2014,	ATOS	have	 reported	20	meetings	with	 European	Commission	





Leonardo	 (formally	 Finmeccanica)	 is	 an	 Italian	 arms	 and	 defence	 company	 specializing	 in	 the	





the	 Italy-Libya	 ‘Friendship	 Pact’	 in	 which	 €5bn	 was	 earmarked	 for	 providing	 surveillance	
equipment	 to	be	used	 in	 combatting	 irregular	migration	 to	Europe	 (Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013).	
Leonardo	has	a	subsidiary	joint	venture	company	called	Telespazio,	owning	67%	and	where	French	
Thales	 owns	 the	 remaining	 33%.	 Through	 this	 the	 company	 has	 been	 able	 to	 land	 significant	
contracts	 within	 the	 space	 industry	 (Telespazio,	 2019).	 Leonardo	 has	 registered	 3	 lobbyists	 in	
Brussels	and	a	budget	of	around	€300.000-400.000	per	year.	Reponsible	for	EU	relations	 is	the	





radar	 systems	 and	 space	 technology.	 In	 2018,	 it	 had	 a	 revenue	 of	 €15,8bn	 and	 over	 80.000	
employees	(Thales,	2019b).	Since	2012,	Thales	has	been	developing	drone	technology	for	use	by	
Frontex	 (Akkerman,	 2019).	 With	 Thales’	 acquisition	 of	 Gemalto	 –	 a	 company	 specializing	 in	
biometrics	which	had	itself	already	incorporated	3M’s	Identity	Management	business	–	they	have	
shown	 a	 clear	 interest	 in	 developing	 their	 company	 down	 this	 line	 (Ibid.).	 Through	 their	 joint	
venture	company	Thales	Alenia	(33%	owned	by	Leonardo),	they	have	also	been	awarded	multiple	
large	contracts	in	the	space	sector	over	the	last	half	decade,	securing	over	€600m	in	Copernicus	
contracts	 between	 2015-18	 (ESA,	 2019).	 Thales	 have	 registered	 6	 lobbyists	 in	 Brussels,	with	 a	
budget	of	 around	€300.000,	 and	answering	 to	 the	Senior	Vice	President	 for	 EU,	NATO	and	EU	
relations,	Marc	Cathelineau.		
Alongside	 these,	both	3M	and	Gemalto	also	 registered	 lobbyists.	Thus,	 from	2014	and	
until	its	take-over	by	Gemalto,	3M	registered	five	lobbyists,	of	which	Maxime	Bureau,	Director	of	
Government	 Affairs	 and	 EMEA	 was	 the	 main	 responsible.	 Its	 lobbying	 budget	 was	 between	
€600.000	and	699.000.		Gemalto	registered	only	one	lobbyist,	who	from	2014	had	three	meetings	
with	representatives	from	the	European	Commission.	The	person	with	main	responsibility	for	the	
relation	 with	 the	 EU	 was	 Marie	 Figarella,	 VP	 Institutional	 Relations,	 with	 a	 budget	 between	
Profit	and	Protection	in	EU	Markets	for	Border	Control		
	 	 p.	33	






Indra	 is	 a	 Spanish	 ICT	 and	 consultancy	 aiming	 at	 becoming	 specialists	 in	 border	 security,	
particularly	regarding	biometrics	for	integrated	border	systems.	In	2018,	they	achieved	revenues	
of	 €3,1bn	 and	 employed	 43.000	 people	 (Indra,	 2019).	 Founded	 in	 1993,	 the	 company	 was	
reporting	a	 significant	 interest	 in	border	markets	by	2008	 (Indra,	2008).	By	2015,	 security	 and	
defence	accounted	for	19%	of	company	revenue	(Akkerman,	2016).	 Indra	have	been	especially	
active	in	forming	and	leading	consortiums	in	the	border	control	arena;	PERSEUS	and	Operation	
Seahorse	 being	 two	 examples	 (Indra,	 2011).	 Indra	 registered	 six	 lobbysists	 in	 Brussels,	 with	 a	
budget	 between	 €900.000	 and	 €1.000.000.	 The	 main	 responsible	 for	 lobby	 operations	 was	
Director	David	Luengo	Riesco.	























it	 collaborates	with	Accenture	 and	Morpho	and	has	 received	multiple	 framework	 contracts	 to	
create	 the	 VIS	 database.	 HP	 has	 registered	 two	 in-house	 lobbyists,	 of	whom	 Irena	 Bednarich,	




(IBM,	 2019a)	 and	 employs	 380.000	 people	 (Forbes,	 2019e).	 IBM	 has	 a	 dedicated	 border	
management	division,	providing	technology	solutions	 including	real-time	risk	assessment	(IBM,	
2019b).	In	2018,	in	collaboration	with	the	Danish	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Danish	Refugee	
Council,	 it	 co-developed	 a	 Predictive	Modeling	 of	Mixed	Migration	 Flows-tool,	 the	MM4Sight,	
designed	 to	 forecast	 the	 creation	 and	 direction	 of	 forced	 displacement,	 based	 on	 machine	
learning.	It	is	one	of	the	most	prolifically	lobbying	companies	when	it	comes	to	setting	up	meetings	








irregular	 basis,	 others	 organize	 strings	 of	 meetings	 throughout	 the	 year,	 and	 along	 different	
Commission	portfolios.	This	point	is	crucial	when	trying	to	assess	the	relative	influence	yielded	by	
these	companies.	For	while	they	may	primarily	supply	services	for	security,	military,	aerospace,	
ICT	 and	 biometrics	 purposes,	 they	 situate	 themselves	 on	many	more	 levels	 of	 influence	with	








section	 are	 not	 the	 only	way	 through	which	 commercial	 interests	 are	 pursued.	 There	 is	 great	
opaqueness	on	these	issues,	for	instance,	when	it	comes	to	how	such	actors	lobby	the	Commission	
on	the	phrasing	and	wording	of	communications	and	legislative	drafts	and	acts.	This	is	at	least	in	
part	 because	 of	 the	 daunting	 number	 of	 Directorate	 Generals,	 agencies,	 departments	 and	
associated	 funding	 instruments.	 The	 Committees	 and	 Sub-Committees	 of	 the	 European	
Parliament	have	also	grown	as	a	site	of	lobbyism	efforts	as	its	influence	on	Union	law-making	has	
been	 increasing	over	 the	 last	decade.	But	 in	general,	 the	greater	 the	 lack	of	 transparency,	 the	
higher	 likelihood	 of	 informal	 interventions	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 policies,	 funding	 priorities	 and	
legislations	(cf.	Baird,	2018).	
	 The	lobbying	efforts	may	take	several	forms.	A	widespread	strategy	is	described	by	the	
interest	 organization	 ASD:	 Companies	 wishing	 to	 be	 “proactive	 and	 strive	 to	 generate	 new	
procurement	opportunities”	should	engage	with	representatives	from	their	Member	State	who	
are	placed	 in	 the	Programme	Committee	of	 the	 funding	 instruments	desired	by	 the	 company.	
Since	these	Programme	Committees	are	responsible	for	deciding	on	the	content	of	future	Work	
Programmes,	says	the	ASD,	“companies	can	advocate	vis-à-vis	“their”	national	representative	to	
increase	 the	 number	 of	 tenders	 open	 to	 industry	 and	 to	 include	 more	 projects	 on	 physical	
[security]	capabilities	rather	than	on	institution	building”	(ASD,	2016,	p.10).	
The	ASD	underscores	that	particularly	in	the	run-up	to	the	mid-term	reviews	of	funding	







lobbyists,	 who	 can	 arrange	 meetings	 with	 the	 relevant	 Directorate	 Generals	 or	 higher-level	
Commission	representatives,	or	approach	MEPs.	External	lobbyists,	like	communications	bureaus,	
may	also	orchestrate	larger	media	campaigns	in	targeted	European	cities	and	financial	centres	on	
behalf	of	 their	 client	companies.	Both	kinds	of	 lobbyists	also	collaborate	or	 facilitate	networks	

















as	 law	firms,	communications	bureaus	and	public	 relations	 firms.	The	 largest	of	 these	external	














MEPs,	 representatives	 from	 interest	 groups,	 as	well	 as	 actors	 from	 the	 industrial	 sector.	Often	
business	 interests	 have	 been	 integral	 to	 their	 foundation,	whereas	 the	 intergroups	 have	 been	
organized	according	to	parliamentary	rules	(European	Parliament,	2019;	see	also,	1999).		
4.3.2	Intergroups	
These	 are	 forums	 of	MEPs	 assembled	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 specific	 topics	 or	 themes	 through	
informal	exchanges	and	facilitated	contact	with	extra-parliamentary	actors.	More	than	70	groups	















a	 platform	 for	 an	 interdisciplinary	 debate,	 by	 engaging	 policymakers,	 the	 industry	 and	 the	
scientific	community,	and	aims	at	leading	to	tangible	conclusions	that	will	inspire	future	political	





The	SSI’s	close	ties	to	the	military	 industry	differs	 from	another	 intergroup	relevant	for	
European	border	control,	namely	that	on	Digital	Agenda.	By	comparison,	it	did	not	report	receiving	
any	administrative	or	financial	support	from	industry	(EU	Parliament,	2015).	Intergroups	represent	




is	 the	 Kangaroo	Group.	 It	 presents	 itself	 as	 focused	 on	 “free	movement	 and	 security”,	 and	 as	
working	towards	abolishing	internal	borders	and	facilitating	a	Single	Market,	whilst	strengthening	
the	Union’s	 external	 border	 control.	 The	Group	was	 formed	 in	 1979	 as	 “an	 informal	 group	 of	
friends	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament,”	 it	 is	 now	 registered	 as	 a	 Belgian	 NGO.	 A	 look	 at	 its	
membership	is	illustrative	of	the	ways	in	which	such	lobby	groups	exercise	influence	in	and	beyond	
the	public	bodies.	In	2019	its	members	included	honorary	members	in	the	form	of	a	former	French	







Defence	 (Kangaroo	Group,	 2020a).	 The	Group	 also	 listed	 37	members	 from	other	 institutions,	
academia	and	experts,	including	professors,	former	MEPs	and	38	members	from	industry,	services	
and	 trade.	These	 include	representatives	 from	Nokia,	aerospace	and	defence	companies	Volvo	
and	 Saab,	 Safran	Group,	Airbus,	 the	 European	Organisation	of	Military	Associations	 and	Trade	
Unions	 (EUROMIL),	 the	 German	 steel	 industry	 (Wirthchaftsvereinigung	 Stahl),	 and	 the	 British	
satellite	 and	 telecommnuications	 company	 Inmarsat	 (Kangaroo	 Group,	 2020b).	 The	 Kangaroo	







end,	 the	Group	 focuses	on	 the	 “future	of	 Frontex,	 Eurosur	 and	 the	humanitarian	and	 security	
aspects	of	the	protection	of	our	external	borders.”	More	concretely,	it	lobbies	for	the	creation	of	
common	technical	 standards	 for	an	EU	security	and	defence	market	eager	 to	use	 technologies	
such	 as	 “Remotely	 Piloted	 Aircraft	 Systems	 and	 their	 admission	 to	 the	 European	 Airspace,	





The	 Kangaroo	Group	 has	 also	 hosted	 a	 series	 of	 events,	workshops	 and	 luncheons	 convening	











The	 various	 groups	 often	 seek	 to	 influence	 political	 discussions	 and	 policy-making	 by	







foundation	 for	 industrial	 sectors,	 commercial	 actors	 are	 far	 from	 passive	 socialisees	 of	 policy	
dictates.	While	many	commentators,	 journalists	and	civil	organizations	 rightly	worry	about	 the	
increasing	influence	of	such	commercial	priorities	on	EU	border	policy-making,	the	possibility	for	
maneuverability	still	exists,	depending	on	the	actors	in	question.	In	such	cases,	it	is	more	accurate	





Such	 processes	 illustrate	 how	 new	 political	 priorities	 may	 also	 seep	 back	 into	 the	
discourses	and	priorities	of	commercial	actors.	For	instance,	the	increased	political	awareness	of	
environmental	 issues	has	come	to	 feature	more	prominently	 in	security	 industry	discourses	on	




organizations	 increasingly	rely	on	satellite	 imagery	 in	this	regard.	 In	one	new	item,	Airbus	thus	










as	 actors	 involved	 in	multileveled	 policy-making	 on	 EU	 borders.	 They	 organize	meetings	 with	








Rolls	 Royce,	 Airbus,	Naval	Group,	 Kongsberg	Defence	&	Aerospace,	 Safran,	 Leonardo	 and	 BAE	
Systems.	ASD’s	head	office	is	based	in	Brussels,	thus	closely	located	to	the	corridors	of	power	in	
the	 EU.	 Its	 lobby	budget	 for	 2015	was	 €298.000	 (Jones,	 2016),	 however,	 questions	 have	been	




Space,	 Defense	 and	 Security	 Industries.	 It	 was	 formed	 in	 2004	 when	 the	 older	 industry	
associations	 EDIG,	 AECMA	 and	 EUROSPACE	were	 combined.	 According	 to	 its	 own	website,	 its	
members	combine	to	employ	864.000	people,	and	generated	a	turnover	of	€228,5	million	in	2017	
(ASD,	2018).	ASD	is	promoting	the	interests	of	its	members	by	being	in	constant	dialogue	with	EU	
institutions,	 like	 the	European	Commission	and	 stakeholders,	 organizing	public-private	 forums,	






Additionally,	 the	 ASD	 also	 positions	 itself	 as	 an	 expert	 on	 policy	matters,	 framing	 itself	 as	 an	
“intelligence	 hub	 for	 expert	 knowledge	 on	 industry-related	 issues”	 (Heinrich,	 2015).	 	 Border	






and	 border	 management	 infrastructures,	 it	 encourages	 further	 harmonization	 of	 border	
equipment	needs	at	European	level,	and	seeks	to	stimulate	the	procurement	of	such	equipment	
at	the	national	level	(ASD,	2020).	ASD	has	also	functioned	as	the	secretariat	for	the	SSI,	which	the	
Secretary	General,	 Jan	Pie,	described	 in	2016	as	“an	extremely	effective	 forum	to	engage	with	
MEPs”	(ASD,	2016,	p.1)	
4.3.4.2	European	Organization	for	Security	(EOS)	
EOS	was	developed	 in	2007,	 from	the	already	existing	ASD,	by	 the	 former	CEO	of	Thales,	Luigi	
Rebuffi,	and	operates	in	15	different	countries.	Its	chairman	is	Giorgio	Mosca	from	Leonardo,	and	




as	 “the	 development	 of	 a	 consistent	 European	 Security	Market	 sustaining	 the	 interests	 of	 its	
Members”	 (EOS,	 2009,	 p.15)	 It	 claims	 to	 work	 closely	 with	 the	 Commission	 and	 Directorate	
Generals	 (DGs),	 and	 is	 regularly	 participating	 in	 EU	 Task	 Forces,	 expert	 groups	 and	 research	
projects	funded	by	Commission	instruments.		
	The	 EOS	has	 argued	 that	 the	most	 effective	 counter-measures	 to	 immigration	 require	
more	 common	 European,	 as	 opposed	 to	 national,	 border	 initiatives	 (Ibid.).	 This	 has	 led	 it	 to	
recommend	the	implementation	of	innovative	surveillance	technologies	and	the	creation	of	EU-










Group,	 co-chaired	 by	Giorgio	Gulienetti	 of	 (Leonardo)	 and	 Peter	 Smallridge	 (Gemalto),	 among	
others	(EOS,	2020b).		











The	 interest	 groups	 active	 on	 the	 market	 for	 border	 security	 often	 try	 to	 mirror	 the	




Civil	 Protection	 (including	 crisis	 management);	 Energy	 Infrastructures	 Security	 and	 Resilience;	




to	 facilitate	 the	co-constitution	of	norms	 through	collaboration	on	events	or	projects,	but	also	











by	 promoting	 a	 “common	 innovation	 culture”	 and	 aligning	 research	 agendas	 between	 EU	 and	
Member	States	security	policies.		









established	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Archimedes	 project,	 through	 a	 number	 of	 industry	 stakeholder	
roundtables,	organised	by	EOS.		
Archimedes	can	thus	be	seen	as	one	node	in	the	multi-leveled	public-private	governance	










Fleishman-Hillard;	 representatives	 from	Member	State	ministries	of	 interior	and	defence,	 from	
European	organizations	like	the	Directorate	General	for	Home	Affairs,	and	Fisheries	and	Maritime	
Affairs,	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	NATO,	as	well	as	representatives	from	companies	like	
Thales,	 Safran,	 Cassidian,	 Symantec,	 SAAB;	 non-state	 actors	 like	 the	 International	 Centre	 for	
Migration	 Policy	 Development	 (ICMPD)	 and	 the	 IOM	 as	 well	 as	 ten	 representatives	 from	 the	
consultancy	firm	PriceWaterhouseCoopers.	But	not	all	reflected	interests	in	security;	some	press	
officers,	 as	 well	 as	 representatives	 from,	 respectively,	 feminist	 socialists	 and	 the	 Bolivian	
government	also	participated	(SDA,	2010).	
Both	in	February	2011	and	March	2012,	the	EOS	and	the	Commissioner	for	Home	Affairs,	
Cecilie	Malmström,	 organized	 High	 Level	 Public-Private	 Security	 Roundtables.	 In	 the	 first	 one,	
European	 industrial	 actors,	 the	 Hungarian	 EU	 presidency,	 executive	 management	 of	 EU	
institutions	 and	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Interior	 of	 Member	 States	 were	 brought	 together.	 The	
Roundtable	was	to	“explore	ways	of	how	the	public	and	private	side	can	together	contribute	to	
the	implementation	of	EU	security	policies.”	Before	the	meeting,	Malmström	stated	“I	am	looking	
















Already	 in	 May	 2011,	 the	 Commission	 held	 another	 High	 level	 summit,	 namely	 a	
Conference	 on	 Defence	 and	 Security	 Industries	 and	 Markets.	 Its	 focus	 was	 the	 transfer	 and	
procurement	of	defence	technology,	how	to	build	up	the	demand	side	of	the	security	market,	and	
discussions	of	the	risk	of	cuts	to	defence	and	security	budgets	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.	It	was	
hosted	 by	 Antonio	 Tajani,	 the	 Vice-President	 of	 the	 European	 Commission,	 responsible	 for	
Industry	and	Entrepreneurship,	and	Michel	Barnier,	the	EU	Commissioner	for	Internal	Market	and	
Services.	 Invited	 speakers	 included	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 of	 the	 European	 Defence	 Agency,	
representatives	from	Swedish,	Italian	and	Polish	Ministries	of	Defence,	and	the	CEOs	of	MBDA	and	
Thales,	the	Chairman	of	Finmeccanica	(now	Leonardo),	as	well	as	the	President	of	the	ASD.	During	
the	 conference,	 it	 was	 emphasized	 that	 Europe	 needed	 to	 set	 higher	 ambitions	 for	 Common	
Defence	and	Security	Policy,	something	Vice-President	Tajani	underscored	required	a	strong	and	
competitive	defence	industry	(EC,	2011c).	









the	 level	of	 interest-based	organization,	the	workshop	also	 included	participants	from	the	EOS,	
ASD,	 the	 German	 European	 Security	 Association	 (GESA)	 and	 the	 Confederation	 of	 European	
Security	Services	(CoESS)(EC,	2011d).	
	 When	the	Security	Industrial	Policy	was	published,	it	was,	in	other	words,	also	the	result	
of	much	 hard	work	 from	 the	 security	 and	military	 industry,	 eager	 to	 reinvent	 itself	 as	 an	 “EU	
Brand”	of	security	that	included	border	control.	The	various	actors	had	worked	for	a	policy	with	
close	relations	between	technology	providers	and	end	users,	with	US-level	subsidies	to	research	














border	 guards	of	 the	European	Border	 and	Coast	Guard	 (Frontex).	 This	 represented	a	massive	


















by	Member	States	with	 the	 financial	and	 technical	 support	of	 the	EU.”	 (European	Commission	
2018g).	Also,	the	Commission	noted	that	partnerships	and	cooperation	with	third	countries	will	










orbiting	 in	 space	 (ESA	 2018).	 This	 agenda	 was	 pursued	 through	 several	 workshops,	 like	 the	
international	workshop	HAPS4ESA	held	in	Leiden,	the	Netherlands	between	February	12-14	2017.	
Here	 actors	 like	 ESA,	 EMSA,	 EU	 Satellite	 Center,	 the	 European	Commission	 gave	presentations	
alongside	 companies	 including	 German	 Frank	 Fuchs	 Consulting,	 Spanish	 satellites	 company	
Hispasat,	 Thales	Alenia	 Space,	Airobotics,	 Airbus,	 Skytec,	 Skytec,	 as	well	 as	 the	Universities	 of	
León,	 California	 and	 York.	More	 generally,	 the	ASD	has	 stressed	 the	need	 to	 continue	 existing	
Horizon	 2020	 funding	 streams	 towards	 research	 in	 border	 security	 in	 general	 under	 the	
Multiannual	 Financial	 Framework	 2021-2027,	 and	 to	 foster	 the	 growth	 of	 “breakthrough	
technologies”	in	particular	(ASD	2019).	This	would	include	continuing	projects	such	as	TELEO	and	









Ad	hoc	Working	Party	on	 the	Multiannual	 Financial	 Framework,	 and	 the	more	 specific	Ad	hoc	
Working	 Party	 on	 JHA	 (Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs)	 Financial	 Instruments.	 However,	 the	 Council	
refused	to	keep	any	records	from	the	Parties¢	meetings,	thereby	preventing	public	scrutiny	into	
the	multi-billion	euro	priorities	of	the	Member	State	governments	(Statewatch	2018a).	Moreover,	





On	 December	 2019,	 the	 Finnish	 Presidency	 published	 the	 MFF	 Negotiating	 Box	 with	
figures	and	options	up	for	negotiation.	Then,	on	December	12,	the	European	Council	discussed	
the	Framework´s	main	features.	From	February	12	to	21	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	






“wish	 lists”	based	on	prevailing	political	 knowledge	 regimes	and	priorities,	 according	 to	which	
companies	 then	 develop	 technologies.	 These	 wish	 lists	 then	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 tenders	 and	
procurement	processes	through	which	corporate	actors	try	to	research	and	develop	technology	




the	 technocratic	 networks	 responsible	 for	 producing	 and	 disseminating	 the	 discourses.	 Such	
approaches	therefore	often	do	not	embed	discourses	in	particular	social	practices	and	epistemic	




widely.	 Although	 they	 are	 crucial	 for	 both	 common-European	 and	 national	 legislation,	 policy-
making	and	bordering	practices,	these	still	tend	to	be	debated	by	a	narrow	and	specialist	audience	






Second,	 norms	 are	 both	 embedded	 in	 and	 diffused	 through	 technologies	 (Guittet	 and	
Jeandesboz,	2010):	Border	technologies	like	EU	satellites,	databases	or	externalized	surveillance	
co-create	 certain	 knowledge	 regimes	 replete	 with	 cultural	 frames	 of	 reference	 about	 the	
legitimate	 functions	 and	 consequences	 of	 border	 control	 practices.	 Hence,	 technologies	 like	
biometrics,	but	also	satellite	and	drone	surveillance	or	infra-red	and	motion	detection,	are	more	
than	 apolitical	 wish	 lists.	 They	 are	 sites	 shaped	 by	 the	 continuously	 converging	 interests	 of	
multiple	actors,	both	shaped	by,	and	shaping,	the	preferences	of	EU	policy-makers	and	companies	
alike.	
Here,	 some	 studies	have	 focused	on	how	companies	may	 seek	 to	 influence	EU	policy	 through	
























technology,	 the	 major	 actors	 on	 the	 market	 for	 EU	 border	 control	 lobby	 EU	 institutions	 by	
replicating	 their	 focus	 on	 resisting	 market	 “fragmentation”	 through	 standardized	 and	
interoperable	border	technologies.	The	commercial	 influence	on	multileveled	governance	must	









and	 associated	 technological	 infrastructure,	 and	 increasingly	 perilous	 and	 life-threatening	
migration	 routes	 for	 third	 country	 nationals.	 The	 EOS	 statement	 that	 fundamental	 rights	 are	
politically	 correct	 but	 not	 necessarily	 a	 competitive	 advantage,	 testifies	 to	 the	 troubling	
implications	 of	 depoliticized	 narratives	 of	 technological	 optimization	 concerning	 EU	 border	
governance.	 At	 another	 level,	 this	 framing	 ignores	 how	 the	 standardized	 technological	
infrastructures	lobbied	for	by	the	security	and	defence	industry	also	have	the	effect	of	shaping	EU	




is	 the	 need	 to	 level	 the	 security-industrial	 playing	 field	 with	 Asian	 and	 American	 economies.	
Accordingly,	 the	 ETPs	 and	 later	 ETIPs	 and	 their	 role	 in	 shaping	 EU	 border	 technologies	 are	
promoted	 as	 fostering	 EU	 competitiveness.	 However,	 the	 AGs	 and	 ETPs/ETIPs	 have	 also	 been	





industry	 and	 Commission	 for	 increased	 subsidies.	 While	 heralded	 as	 innovation	 by	 the	
Commission,	these	initiatives	mirror	the	interests	of	a	narrow	elite	of	the	largest	European	security	







last	 decades.	 Parallel	 to	 industrial	 calls	 for	more	 standardization	 and	 interoperability,	 political	
visions	of	integrated	border	systems	have	grown.	This	has	tied	the	political	and	technical	processes	
closely	 to	 procurement	 and	 research	 and	 development	 from	 corporate	 and	 industrial	 actors.	
These	 have	 been	 hired	 to	 consult	 on,	 design,	 develop,	 maintain	 and	 evolve	 the	 information,	
identification	and	surveillance	systems.		
The	 following	 section	 details	 this	 development	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 four	 EU	
databases	pertaining	to	the	entry	of	migrants	and	deploying	biometrics	to	that	end.	These	are	the	
Schengen	 Information	 System	 (SIS),	 Eurodac,	 the	 Visa	 Information	 System	 (VIS),	 the	 uropean	
Criminal	Records	Information	System	for	Third	Country	Nationals	(ECRIS-TCN)	and	the	Entry/Exit	






























The	 EU	 databases	 have	 been	 developing	 according	 to	 which	 types	 of	 individuals	 are	
registered;	Irregular	migrants	found	in	member	states	can	be	registered	into	SIS,	asylum	seekers	
are	 registered	 in	Eurodac	and	 those	entering	on	a	 legal	visa	are	 registered	 in	VIS.	The	 four	EU	
information	 systems	 combine	 biometric	 identification	 technology	 with	 computerised	 data	




The	Schengen	Information	System	 (now	SIS	 II)	was	the	first	 large-scale	 IT	system	put	 in	
place	in	the	EU,	and	was	designed	to	compensate	for	the	abolition	of	internal	border	controls	in	










member	 state,	 but	 continuously	 communicating	 with	 the	 central	 database;	 and	 an	 in-build	
communication	 infrastructure	making	 it	possible	 for	Member	State	authorities	 to	enter,	delete	










and	 Europol	 law	 enforcement	 access	 to	 the	 database	 (Orav	 and	 D’Alfonso,	 2017).	 Eurodac	
underpins	the	Dublin	III	Regulation	and	its	predecessors	and	their	aim	to	limit	the	possibility	of	
applying	for	asylum	in	more	than	one	country,	and	singling	out	one	Member	State	as	responsible	
for	 processing	 such	 applications.	 Originally,	 Eurodac	 stored	 fingerprint	 data	 and	 alphanumeric	
data	concerning	 the	gender	of	 the	person,	but	 the	2013	Regulation	expanded	 this	purpose	by	
demanding	fingerprints	from	all	persons	over	the	age	of	14.	These	were	further	divided	into	three	
groups	of	people:	asylum	seekers	(category	1),	persons	who	cross	European	borders	in	irregular	














then	 overstayed	 their	 visa.	 This	 system	 is	 used	 by	 member	 states	 to	 facilitate	 short-stay	 visa	
procedures,	while	at	the	same	time	helping	border,	asylum	and	migration	authorities	to	check	the	
necessary	information	on	TCNs,	who	need	to	travel	to	the	EU	(European	Commission,	2018b).	It	











biometrics	 like	 fingerprints	and	potentially	also	 facial	 images.	 It	was	an	extension	of	 the	ECRIS	




aims	 to	 enable	 authorities	 to	 quickly	 establish	 whether	 any	 EU	Member	 State	 holds	 criminal	




Eurojust	 and	 the	 future	 European	 Public	 Prosecutors’	 Office	 will	 have	 access	 to	 ECRIS-TCN,	
alongside	judges	and	prosecutors	from	EU	member	states	(EU-Lisa	2019).	EU-Lisa	is	responsible	





to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 (European	 Commission,	 2016d),	 and	 established	 in	 2017	 via	

























From	 the	 beginning,	 the	 political	 drive	 towards	 contructing	 border	 infrastructures	 with	








the	 development	 of	 the	 large-scale	 information	 systems.	 The	 Agency	 has	 also	 been	 made	
responsible	for	additional	framework	contracts	covering	services	for	management,	supervision,	







place	within	 a	 context	where	 transnational	 networks	 of	 security	 professionals	 and	 justice	 and	
home	 affairs	 bureaucrats	 were	 actively	 reconfiguring	 EU	 mobility	 governance	 towards	 the	





for	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 system’s	 functions	 and	 purposes	 and	 created	 problematic	 path	
dependencies	influencing	also	the	SIS	II	system,	and	later	the	Union’s	Smart	Borders	package.		
Relations	 between	 EU	 institutions,	 Member	 States	 but	 also	 commercial	 actors	 from	































technical	 deadlock	 and	 successfully	 lobbied	 for	 an	 interim	 solution	 where	 the	 Portuguese	


















because	 the	Council	 finally	opted	 to	continue	with	 the	original	Steria-contract	 for	SIS	 II.	 It	was	
implemented	on	May	27,	2013,	and	announced	shortly	thereafter	(Sopra	Steria,	2013).		
But	 by	 then,	 the	 Commission	was	 already	 fast	 at	 work	 with	 visions	 of	 new	 upgraded	
functionalities	to	the	database.	Thus,	a	few	months	earlier,	it	had	announced	the	Smart	Borders	




the	 EES	 remained,	 now	 with	 a	 stated	 ambition	 of	 interoperability	 with	 the	 existing	 systems,	
including	 the	SIS	 II.	At	 the	 same	 time,	EU-Lisa	had	commenced	 its	operations	out	of	Tallinn	 in	
December	2012,	and	it	was	hoped	that	that	the	new	agency	would	be	able	to	balance	the	intricate	
political-economic	 interests	underpinning	 the	EU	border	systems	 (Jeandesboz,	Bigo,	Hayes	and	
Simon,	2013).		
EU-Lisa	would	not,	however,	commence	its	balancing	act	between	maintaining	the	EU’s	
large-scale	 information	 systems	 and	 entertaining	 too	 close	 relations	 with	 European	 industrial	
interests,	on	a	blank	slate.	The	situation	was	 in	fact	quite	the	opposite,	since	the	technological	
research	 and	 development	 structuring	 EU	 border	 control	 systems,	 had	 been	 proceeding	 fast	
alongside	the	SIS	 II	controversy.	This	had	taken	place	 in	yet	another	 level	open	for	commercial	
interventions,	 namely	 the	 formulation	 of	 FP7	 and	 later	 Horizon	 priorities	 for	 research	 and	
development.	
5.2.1	Commercial	interventions	–	priorities	under	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	



























dominated	 the	 SecAG	 since	 its	 inception	 at	 the	beginning	of	 FP7,	 and	 its	 effect	 can	be	 traced	
observing	the	resulting	formulation	of	Work	Programmes	and	their	calls.	
For	instance,	during	the	2007	Work	Programme,	a	topic		was	called	“SEC-2007-3.1-01	–	











individuals,	 goods	and	platforms.”	 It	 also	 requested	projects	able	 to	 “fuse	data	 from	disparate	
systems	 (identity	 management,	 inteliigence	 etc.)”	 (European	 Commission,	 2007,	 p.	 20).	 The	






and	 was	 coordinated	 by	 Italian	 E-Geos.	 It	 also	 included,	 among	 others,	 GMV	 Aerospace	 and	















The	 SecAG	 for	Horizon	 2020	was	 chaired	 by	 the	 former	 Finmeccanica	 CEO	Alberto	 de	
Benedictis.	It	immediately	struck	chords	similar	to	its	predecessor,	when	it	came	to	public-private	
interactions	 in	 EU	 border	 systems.	 During	 its	 first	 meeting	 on	 February	 27,	 2014	 the	 group	
discussed	 how	 to	 handle	 cases	 of	 funding	 close-to-market	 research	 topics.	 Distinguishing	 first	
between	 practices	 for	 “public	 procurement	 for	 innovative	 solutions”	 and	 those	 for	 “pre-
commercial	 procurement”,	 the	 group	 then	 argued	 the	 need	 for	 their	 convergence.	 To	 the	









with	 no	 physical	 barriers”.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 controls	 should	 be	 “triggered	 by	 alerts	 activated	
throughout	 the	EU	and	not	exclusively	at	border	 crossings”	 leading	 to	 “a	 single	EU-wide	entry	
protocol	and	monitoring”	of	non-European	citizens	mobility	within	the	EU“.	(Ibid.)	
To	achieve	this,	the	group	argued,	it	would	be	necessary	to	step	up	investments	in	security	
technology	 in	 order	 to	 create	 “an	 integrated	 border	 management”	 through	 a	 “technology	
investment	road	map”	and	large-scale	pilots	in	cooperation	with	industry	and	end-users	covering	
“systems,	equipment,	 tools,	processes	 for	 rapid	 identification	 for	both	control	and	surveillance	
issue.”	(Ibid.).	PASAG	informed	the	Commission	that	such	an	effort	would	lead	to	the	creation	of	
“new	markets”	for	advanced	security	products	“with	access	to	an	open	EU	and	export	market”,.	









it	 transpires	 how	 commercial	 interests	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 shaping	 the	 infrastructures	 of	
interoperable	and	standardized	border	and	entry	control	on	multiple	 levels.	As	such,	Figure	15	
illustrates	 the	 path	 dependency,	 or	 lock-in	 effect	 (Menz,	 2013)	 characterizing	 the	multileveled	
evolution	of	interoperable	EU	border	systems.		
These	 include	the	Commission’s	 launch	of	blurred	forms	 like	the	GoP,	ESRAB	and	ESRIF	
between	 2003-2007	 and	 the	 AGs	 and	 ETPs	 after	 2005.	 Through	 these,	 European	 biometrics,	
security	and	defence	companies	have	not	only	been	influencing	the	formulation	of	annual	Work	
Programmes	and	specific	topics	under	FP7	and	Horizon	2020’s,	in	Figure	21,	exemplified	by	SEC-
2007-3-2-03	 or	 SEC-2012.3.4-6.	 They	 have	 also	 participated	 in	 the	 research	 consortiums	
responding	to	these	calls,	and	thus	placed	themselves	on	the	receiving	end	of	EU	research	funds.	
In	Figure	15,	these	consortiums	are	represented	by	the	projects	EFFISEC	and	ABCG4EU	(FP7)	and	







recommendation	 of	 autonomous	 and	 robotic	 border	 systems,	was	 the	 autonomous	 swarm	 of	
heterogeneous	Robots	for	BORDER	surveillance	(ROBORDER)	project	(Figure	16).	
			 	
Figure	 15	 -	 H2020	 project,	 The	 autonomous	 swarm	 of	 heterogeneous	 Robots	 for	 BORDER	 surveillance	
(ROBORDER)	project	
ROBORDERS’	 funding	derived	 from	 the	2016	Work	Programme,	which,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
SecAG	 recommendations	 featured	 a	 topic	 entitled	 “SEC-20-BES-2016	 –	 Border	 Security:	




Security	 Sciences	 (€130.812.50),	 the	 English	 Sheffield	 Hallam	 University	 (€473.375)	 and	 the	
National	 and	 Kapodistrian	 University	 of	 Athens	 in	 Greece	 (€418.750).	 Moreover,	 just	 like	 the	
PROTECT	 consortium	 in	 Figure	 21,	 ROBORDER	 illustrates	 an	 observable	 development	whereby	
securitized	militaried	 research	previously	undertaken	by	defence	actors,	 are	 increasingly	being	
pursued	by	academic	institutions	under	the	label	of	border	surveillance.		
	 Alongside	 the	 trajectory	 of	 interoperability	 designs	 identifiable	 between	 AG	
recommendations	for	EU	research	priorities	and	the	consortiums	awarded	funds,	the	commercial	






















whereas	 further	 refinements	 to	 existing	 technology	 were	 needed	 to	 assemble	 the	 devices	 of	
kiosks	(Ibid.).	A	questionnaire	about	the	cost	of	equipment	was	circulated	and	five	companies	on	
the	market	 for	biometric	borders	 responded.	However,	 in	both	 reports,	 all	market	actors	have	
been	anonymized,	and	neither	deals	with	the	political	economy	of	the	biometric	market	for	border	
control	(cf.	Ibid.).		
PriceWaterhouseCoopers	 identified	 costs	 for	 the	 development,	 implementation	 and	






Another	 level	 through	which	 the	 EU	 policy-making	 developed	was	when,	 on	 June	 14,,	
2016,	 EU-Lisa	 organized	 an	 Industry	 Workshop	 in	 Strasbourg	 focused	 on	 how	 the	 hotspot	












and	 promoting	 interoperability	 between,	 strengthened	 existing	 IT	 systems	 for	 border	






the	European	Data	Protection	Supervisor	 (EDPS)	and	 the	EU	Fundamental	Rights	Agency	 (FRA)	




and	EU-Lisa	on	 introducing	 technical	 and	operational	 improvements	of	 the	 systems	within	 the	
existing	legal	bases.	This	recommendation,	however,	illustrates	the	continued,	uneasy	relationship	
between	the	political,	technical	and	legislative	evolutions	of	the	interoperable	EU	borders,	since	
the	Group	also	 recognized	 that	 these	 legal	bases	were	 in	 the	process	of	 substantive	 recasting.	
Furthermore,	the	report	was	completely	void	of	any	discussions	about	industrial	actors,	as	well	as	
































collaboration	 and	 solidarity	 on	 matters	 of	 migration	 management.	 As	 such,	 the	 spill-over	 of	











to	 access	 Eurodac	 for	 return	 purposes,	 transfering	 some	 personal	 data	 to	 that	 effect.	 This	
exchange	of	highly	sensitive	biometric	data	was	framed	by	the	Commission	as	solving	the	problem	
of	asylum	applicants	 refusing	 to	have	 their	 fingerprints	 taken,	and	as	making	 sure	 that	asylum	
seekers	and	refugees	were	registered	in	their	first	countries	of	arrival	(Orav	amd	D’Alfonso,	2017;	





visa	 policies	 had	 changed	 “drastically”	 due	 to	 “migration	 and	 security	 challenges”	 (European	
Commission,	2018c).	The	means	 to	achieve	 this	was	 to	make	VIS	 interoperable	with	 the	other	
large-scale	systems	through	the	European	Search	Portal	(ESP)	and	the	Biometric	Matching	System	
(BMS).	BMS	had	been	constructed	through	a	2006-contract	from	the	Directorate	General	–	Justice	













	 Concerning	the	recast	to	SIS	 III,	 the	European	Commission	undertook	a	comprehensive	
evaluation	of	SIS	II,	which	concluded	that	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	database	should	
be	strengthened	(European	Commission,	2016c).	To	this	end,	three	new	proposals	for	expanding	
the	 use	 of	 the	 database	 were	 included:	 increased	 border	 management;	 increased	 police	 and	
juridical	 cooperation;	 and	 increased	 returns	 of	 TCNs	 from	 EU	 territory,	 all	 of	 which	 required	
expanded	 interoperability	and	 standardization	 (European	Parliament,	2017b).	According	 to	 the	
Commissioner	 for	 Migration,	 Home	 Affairs	 and	 Citizenships,	 Dimitris	 Avramopoulos,	 these	
extensions	were	necessary	in	order	to	“close	information	gaps	and	improve	information	exchange	




based	on	 fingerprints,	 facial	 images,	photographs	and	palm	prints,	 claimed	 to	 constitute	more	




The	original	EES-package	 ratified	 in	2017	proposed,	among	other	 things,	 to	 record	 the	
time/place	of	entry	and	exit	for	TCNs	entering	the	Schengen	Area,	information	that	none	of	the	
other	 databases	 record.	 In	 registering	 and	 tracking	 people’s	 travel	 histories,	 the	 EES	was	 also	
envisioned	 as	 complementing	 alerts	 already	 recorded	 in	 SIS.	Moreover,	 a	 Registered	 Traveller	






thus	 interoperable	 with	 the	 VIS	 database	 via	 a	 Secure	 Communication	 Channel	 established	
between	them,	as	well	as	between	the	EES	Central	System	and	the	National	Uniform	Interface	
(EU-Lisa,	2017;	European	Parliament,	2017b).	The	EES-plans	also	 include	the	development	of	a	







of	 technological	upgrades	and	 infrastructures	 required	 to	 realize	 those	wishes.	 This	 fast-paced	
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evolution	 of	 the	 interoperable	 EU	 border	 systems	 means	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	
infrastructures,	and	upgrading	these	has	become	a	central	and	permanent	priority	in	EU	border	
policy-making.	Moreover,	the	flurry	of	new	systems,	such	as	the	SIS	to	SIS	II,	Eurodac,	the	BMS,	
VIS,	 and	now	EES,	also	 serve	as	 simplifying	arguments	 for	one	another	 (cf.	 Jeandesboz,	2016).	
Trading	on	the	 lock-in	effect	generated	by	the	need	for	 interoperability,	each	system	is	used	to	










mid-2019,	 EU-Lisa	 has	 hosted	 ten	 such	 roundtables	 (see	 Figure	 18).	 This	 recurrent	 dialogue	
between	the	Agency	and	 industry	 is	motivated	as	a	way	to	ensure	clearer	communication,	but	
may	 also	 result	 in	 a	 natural	 affinity	 for	 public-private	 cooperation	 between	 the	 partners	
(Akkerman,	2016).	At	the	Roundtables,	it	possible	for	industrial	actors	to	liaise	with	government	
representatives	 and	 communicate	 their	 preferences	 and	
suggested	 solutions	 to	 the	 development	 of	 IT	 systems.	
Roundtables,	as	well	as	conferences,	are	important	sites	for	the	






The	Roundtables	have	 several	 effects.	On	 the	one	hand,	 if	 the	
same	company	is	invited	to	several	roundtables,	their	chances	to	
influence	EU-Lisa	decisions	on	technological	solutions	becomes	
proportionately	 higher.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 strategy	 also	
requires	 companies	 to	 constantly	 develop	 high-tech	 solutions,	
even	 before	 problems	 corresponding	 to	 the	 technological	
capacities	exist.	As	such,	they	both	influence	the	political	agenda	
so	it	corresponds	to	the	already	developed	solutions,	but	also	be	
challenged	 to	 respond	 to	 sudden,	 and	 potentially	 infeasible,	
political	wishes.		
Through	the	EU-Lisa	Roundtables,	the	relations	between	










needed	 to	 “be	 aware	 of	 state-of-the-art	 hardware	 and	 software	 solutions	 and	 upcoming	
developments	that	could	be	useful	in	Smart	Borders	and	that	may	improve	system	performance	
and/or	effectiveness”.	However,	 the	Agency	also	stated	that	“the	aim	 is	 to	assemble	and	share	
thoughts;	under	no	circumstances	should	the	event	be	considered	as	a	prelude	or	an	advantage	
to	future	procurement	exercises”.	Twenty-five	companies	were	invited	to	the	Roundtable	(EU-Lisa,	
2014b,	 p.	 14).	 For	 the	 2015	 Roundtable,	 headlined	 “Future	 of	 Secure	 and	 Efficient	 IT	 service	
provision”,	 nine	 companies	were	 invited	 alongside	 representatives	 from	DG	Home,	 a	Member	
State	and	the	EU	funded	research	project	ABC4EU.	The	companies	included	Morpho,	Augmentiq,	
Accenture,	 Jenetric,	 AOS,	 Secunet	 and	 CrossMatch.	 Two	 industry	 sessions	were	 organized,	 on	
“identity	and	risk”	and	“biometric	hardware	and	software”	(EU-Lisa	2015b).	
	 In	 2016,	 under	 the	 heading	 “Interoperable	 IT	 systems	 for	 Europe:	 Towards	 greater	




representatives	 from	the	 industry	presented	their	perspectives	on	 interoperability,	namely	one	
from	the	German	ITC	company,	Oracle,	the	tech	company	SAP,	and	from	French	Safran	(Ibid.,	p.3).		
After	the	presentation	followed	a	panel	discussion	with	participation	of	Deloitte,	Space	
Hellas,	 Aware,	 and	 HP.	 The	 2017	 Roundtable	 focused	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 single	 search	
European	 portal	 and	 shared	 Biometric	 Matching	 Service.	 At	 the	 event,	 55	 representatives	
participated	from	industry,	alongside	staff	 from	eu-LISA,	EASO	and	Frontex,	and	on	the	agenda	




	 In	 2018,	 EU-Lisa	 hosted	 two	 industry	 Roundtables.	 The	 first	was	 entitled	 “EU	 External	
Borders	–	Streamlining	of	information	exchange”.	The	stated	goal	was	to	facilitate	a	platform	for	
entities	involved	in	the	carriers	of	travellers	to	and	from	the	EU	by	air,	sea	and/or	land.	Industry	
input	 on	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 tools	 for	 advanced	 passenger	 checks	 was	
requested.	It	gathered	39	representatives	from	the	industries,	including	the	companies	Amadeus,	
SITA	 and	 Idemia,	 as	 well	 as	 four	 EU	 member	 states,	 three	 EU	 Agencies	 and	 the	 European	
Commission	(EU-Lisa,	2018a).		
The	second	industry	Roundtable	in	2018	focused	on	technologies	to	facilitate	land	border	
crossings	 at	 the	EU’s	 external	 borders	 and	how	 they	 could	be	 governed	after	 the	EES	became	
operational.	Here,	 15	 industry	 presentations	were	 given,	 and	 in	 total,	 the	 event	 gathered	 101	
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participants	 from	 38	 different	 companies,	 industry	 associations,	 academia	 and	 government	
agencies.		
EU-Lisa’s	executive	director,	Krum	Garkov	opened	the	event	saying	that	there	is	“a	great	




other	 industry	 representatives	 came	 from	 Accenture,	 Atos,	 Gemalto	 (owner	 of	 3M,	 Jenetric),	
Integrated	Biometrics,	Crossmatch	and	SITA.	Also,	a	representative	of	In	Groupe	stated	that	land	
“border	 crossing	processes	must	 be	 adapted	 to	 local	 populations,	 infrastructures	 and	 threats”	
(Ibid.).		
A	 representative	 from	 Gemalto	 repeated	 earlier	 statements	 that	 the	 company	 was	
“particularly	interested	in	the	EES	initiative	which	is	hugely	dependent	on	biometrics	and	checking	






EU	 Land	 and	 Sea	 Border	 Crossings	 Seamless	 and	 Secure	 –	 Operational	 Solutions”.	 Invited	 as	





Commercial	 interests	 have	 been	 a	mainstay	 during	 the	 development	 of	 the	 interoperable	 EU	
border	 systems.	 This	 transpires	 in	 several	ways.	 First,	 the	winners	 of	 framework	 contracts	 are	
placed	 favourably	 for	harvesting	 future	chains	of	contracts	 (for	 the	 first	 such	EES	contract,	 see	
Figure	 17).	 Second,	 the	 political	 desire	 for	 open-ended	 systems	 capable	 of	 being	 continuously	
updated	allows	for	(controversial)	functions	to	be	inserted	into	the	design	of	border	systems,	even	
if	no	political	agreement	has	been	reached.	Third,	such	EU-wide	framework	contracts	also	create	





However,	 as	 feared	 by	 Member	 States	 during	 the	 SIS	 II	 controversy,	 such	 framework	
contracts	also	place	a	few	companies	favourably	on	the	EU	border	database	market.2	At	the	same	
time,	the	seemingly	upscaled	roll-out	of	expensive	and	advanced	surveillance	infrastructures	also	




have	 continued	 to	 influence	 the	 chains	 of	 contracts	 awarded	 by	 EU-Lisa,	 and	 before	 that,	 the	







are	also	political	 risks	with	the	 large	framework	contracts	 for	the	Eurodac,	SIS	and	VIS	systems	
managed	 by	 EU-Lisa.	 This	 is	 because	 these	 frameworks	 require	 contractors	 to	 design	 systems	
allowing	possible	expansions	and	updates	inserted	by	future	political	preferences.	Figures	19-22	
illustrate	 how,	 since	 its	 inception,	 EU-Lisa	 has	 served	 as	 an	 accelerator	 for	 the	 technical	 and	
commercial	vision	of	interoperable	EU	borders	upon	which	political	proposals	for	recast	have	been	
modelled.	 Accordingly,	 since	 2016,	 this	 has	 led	 to	 an	



















Figure	 21	 -	 VIS-contracts	 awarded	 by	 EU-Lisa,	
2014-2019	




by	 comparing	 it	 with	 similar	 large-scale	




EES	 and	 RTP	 have	 risen	 from	 €100	 million	
(estimated	by	the	Commission	in	2008)	to	€1.34	
billion	 in	 a	 2011-estimate.	 The	 repeatedly	
spiralling	costs	of	the	EU	border	databases,	and	
their	lacking	transparency	and	inaccuracy,	was	
found	 to	 be	 created	 by	 project	 management	
issues	 arising	 particularly	 from	 the	 multiple	
interventions	 from	 the	 contracts	 with	
commercial	 actors,	 especially	 “when	 the	
number	 of	 bodies	 able	 to	 intervene	 into	 the	
implementation	 process	 is	 significant,	 which	
results	 in	 lines	 of	 responsibility	 and	
accountability	being	blurred”	(Ibid.).	
This	 development	 also	 yields	 risks	 in	
terms	 of	 lock-in	 effects.	 Thus,	 when	 EU-Lisa	
grant	 successive	 contracts	 not	 just	 for	
development,	 but	 also	 for	 maintenance	 and	
evolution,	 to	 the	 same	 consortiums,	 the	
involved	companies	become	indispensable,	and	













(Statewatch,	 2018b),	 multi-modalities	 or	 the	 inclusion	 of	 commercial	 companies	 in	 searches	
across	 the	 systems	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 motivated.	 Instead,	 the	 overall	 rationale	 of	
interoperability	 risk	 being	 used	 to	 conflate	 distinct	 phenomena	 like	 migration	 management,	
internal	security	and	the	fight	against	terrorism,	is	invoked.	It	has	been	pointed	out	that	while	the	
European	 Commission	 has	 presented	 the	 aim	 of	 interoperability	 as	 a	 way	 to	 effectivize	 the	
interaction	of	systems,	it	also	appear	to	aim	for	cross-matching	data	between	these.	According	to	
the	 European	 Data	 Protection	 Supervisor	 (EDPS)	 this	means	 that	 interoperability	 implies	 new	
forms	 of	 data	 processing	 that	 are	 “not	 covered	 by	 existing	 legal	 bases”,	 leading	 to	 a	 strong	
recommendation	 that	 “their	 impact	 on	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 privacy	 and	 data	 protection	
needs	 to	 be	 carefully	 assessed.”	 (EDPS	 2017,	 6-7).	 Moreover,	 even	 though	 interoperability	 is	
portrayed	as	an	apolitical	and	technological	development,	it	cannot	be	separated	from	the	political	
and	legal	contexts	it	is	implemented	in.		
Such	 political	 contexts	 include	 the	 contested	 and	 life-threatening	 context	 of	 irregular	
immigration	to	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	spill-over	effect	when	political	challenges	stemming	from	
intra-EU	-struggles	are	deemed	solvable	by	being	transferred	into	information	exchanges	via	large-
scale	 information	 systems.	 It	 has	 been	 stressed	 that	 within	 the	 interoperability	 agenda,	 even	
though	 references	 to	 public	 interests	 are	 made,	 these	 remain	 underdetermined	 and	 vague,	
focusing	on	technical	rather	than	ethical	and	societal	achievements.	However,		technical	feasibility	
is	not	equal	to	legally	or	ethically	justifiability	(EDPS	2019,	7-8).	This	has	led	to	criticisms,	like	that	
agaist	 the	 Eurodac	 system´s	 breach	 of	 the	 purpose	 limitation	 principle,	 since	 the	 database´s	





The	 interests	 and	 activities	 of	 commercial	 actors	 pro-actively	 pursuing	 contracts	 and	
market	 shares	 by	 connecting	 to	 the	 interopability	 agenda	 form	 yet	 another	 crucial	 political	




required	subcontracts	 for	national	systems	yielded	by	 larger	 framework	contracts	harvested	by	
the	same	small	group	of	conglomerates.	
Although	 EU-Lisa	 activity	 is	 an	 obvious	 entry	 point	 to	 analyze	 the	 political	 economy	
underlying	 the	 interoperability	 agenda,	 an	 arguably	 more	 influential	 stage	 in	 EU	 border	
governance	is	found	in	the	influence	yielded	on	the	strategic	funding	priorities	of	FP7	and	Horizon	
2020.	 Here,	 European	 Technology	 Platforms	 and	 Advisory	 Groups,	 both	 with	 members	 from	
industry,	are	supposed	to	provide	neutral	and	divested	advice,	yet	the	analysis	indicates	that	they	
instead	have	framed	the	EU’s	research	agenda	in	ways	which	have	channelled	millions	of	euros	to	
projects	 performing	 tests,	 demonstrations	 and	 validations	 of	 various	 aspects	 of	 interoperable	
border	systems.	This	represents	subsidies	and	pre-commercial	procurement	practices,	and	is	as	





Lisa’s	 close	 interactions	with	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 industrial	 actors.	 The	 continued	 reliance	 on	
contracts	with	external	partners	 risks	creating	an	 internal	 institutional	vacuum	for	 the	kinds	of	





position	 itself	 for,	 future	 contracts.	Also,	profit-driven	actors	may	not	perceive	a	need	 to	 raise	
critique	of	fundamental	assumptions	for	EU	policies,	if	this	undermines	potential	future	contracts.	
Combined,	 these	 three	 challenges	mean	 that	 EU	 policy-makers	may	 experience	 a	 knowledge-






6. EUROSUR:	 Building	 a	 European	 market	 for	 external	 border	
surveillance	
The	European	Border	Surveillance	System	is	a	multipurpose	system	for	monitoring	and	controlling	









Plan	 for	 a	 European	 Union	 Maritime	 Security	 Strategy	 (EUMSS),	 aligned	 with	 the	 plans	 for	
EUROSUR	 (Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 2014).	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 11	 remaining	 National	





borders	 and	 the	 pre-frontier	 area.	 Frontex	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 coordinating	 the	 so-called	
common	application	of	surveillance	tools,	that	is,	the	monitoring	of	specific	areas,	vessels	through	
satellite	 of	 ship	 monitoring	 systems.	 The	 ambition	 is	 the	 rapid	 exchange	 of	 information,	
cooperation	and	joint	border	control	response.	




(Pugliese,	 2013;	 Tazzioli,	 2016).	Moreover,	 others	 have	noted	 that	 alongside	 the	 humanitarian	
appeal,	another	standard	justification	for	many	of	the	EUROSUR	components	and	subprojects	has	
been	an	alleged	fight	against	 illegal	migration	(cf.	Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013),	while	others	again	
argue	 that	 the	 system’s	 evolution	 represents	 a	 steady	 and	 technocratic	 development	 towards	
more	encompassing	border	surveillance	(Rijpma	and	Vermeulen,	2013).	
The	 processes	 through	 which	 EUROSUR	 have	 been	 pursued	 since	 2003	 are	 highly	









relations	 with	 third	 countries.	 For	 instance,	 the	 2015	 EUROSUR	 Handbook	 states:	 “A	 well-




since	 the	mid-1990s,	 and	accelerating	 through	 the	00s,	 European	externalization	policies	have	
facilitated	a	profitable	export	market	 for	 the	 security	 and	defence	 industry.	 In	order	 to	 set	up	
border	 control	 infrastructures,	 third	 countries	 purchase	 traditional	 military	 hardware,	 like	
helicopters,	ships	and	vehicles,	and	other	technologies,	like	biometrics,	drones	and	surveillance	
infrastructures	 (Briani	 et.al.,	 2010;	 Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013).	 Thus,	 between	 2005	 and	 2014,	
companies	from	the	EU	member	states	granted	arms	export	licenses	to	the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa	worth	€82	billion	(Akkerman,	2016).		
In	 general,	 externalization	 illustrates	 how	 EU	 border	 policies	 have	 blurred	 the	 line	
between	 border	 control	 and	 pre-emptive	migration	 control.	 And	while	 such	 exports	 are	 often	
pursued	through	bilateral	venues,	common-European	activities	like	EU	Trust	Fund	for	Africa	and	
EUROSUR	have	also	evolved	to	support	the	material	infrastructures	of	control	spanning	between	
EU	 and	 third	 countries.	 This	 is	 intertwined	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 increase	 in	 security	 and	
military	assistance	to	third	countries	located	along	main	migration	routes,	stated	as	a	policy	goal	
the	Valetta	Summit	and	the	Khartoum	Process.		
However,	 although	 EUROSUR	 documents	 are	 generally	 careful	 not	 to	 state	 any	 direct	


















In	 the	 2003	 feasibility	 study,	 CIVIPOL	 framed	 immigration	 through	 militaristic	 and	
criminalizing	discourses.	Immigration	to	the	EU	was	described	as	placing	“migratory	pressure”	on	
the	 Union,	 and	 those	 facilitating	 irregular	 migration	 as	 “transnational	 crime	 organisations”.	
Remarkably,	 the	 report	 even	 stated	 that	 because	 of	 undocumented	migrants,	 the	 situation	 in	
certain	EU	countries	was	 reaching	a	critical	point	 that	 threatened	“industrial	peace.”	 (CIVIPOL,	
2003,	18).	According	to	the	CIVIPOL	analysis,	 this	put	pressure	on	EU	“front-line	states”,	which	





surveillance	 of	 approaches,	 streamlining	 and	 automating	 control	 of	 entry	 and	 exit	 points	 and	
boosting	operational	intelligence	capabilities”	(CIVIPOL,	2003,	p.	76).	It	also	repeatedly	stressed	













how	 industrial	 security	 and	 defence	 actors	 are	 both	 positioning	 themselves	 and	 also	 being	
positioned	by	EU	institutions,	as	unrivalled	experts	on	a	policy	area,	even	though	they	have	clear	
commercial	 interests	 in	 it.	 Second,	 because	 the	 study,	 at	 a	 very	 early	 stage,	 and	 through	
controversial	 framings,	 introduced	 a	 set	 of	 ideas	 for	 border	 surveillance	 and	 control,	 and	 its	
financing,	which	would	be	followed.	Indeed,	more	than	15	years	on,	many	of	the	ideas,	then	found	
controversial	and	drastic,	have	since	then	come	to	characterize	the	EU	border	practices,	such	as	
SIVE-like	 maritime	 surveillance,	 drone	 patrols	 and	 the	 investment	 in	 biometric	 identification	
technology	in	coordination	with	the	VIS	and	Eurodac	systems	of	all	authorized	crossing	points	in	
Schengen.	Alongside	the	French	state’s	ownership	of	stocks	in	these	three	companies,	CIVIPOL	can	
be	 seen	 as	 illustrating	 the	 public-private	 collusion	 of	 commercial	 interests	 in	 border	 control	
contracts	(see	also	section	6).	
The	 GoP	 appointed	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 2003	 to	 provide	 strategic	 advice	 on	 future	






based	 and	 IT	 technologies	 (GoP,	 2003,	 p.	 18).	 This	 coincided	with	 an	 agreement	 between	 the	
European	 Commission	 and	 the	 European	 Space	 Agency	 (ESA)	 to	 prepare	 for	 a	 GMES	 Space	
Component,	namely	the	Sentinel	family	of	satellites.	GMES	operations	would	commence	in	2011.	
ESA	has	launched	the	Sentinel	satellites	from	the	Spaceport	in	French	Guiana,	a	South	American	
former	 colonial	 territory,	 originally	 colonized	 during	 the	westward	 European	 expansion	 of	 the	
slave-based	Atlantic	sugar	economy.	
Several	of	these	CIVIPOL	and	GoP-recommendations	were	picked	up	by	the	Commission.	
In	 2005,	 the	 European	 Council	 adopted	 the	 "Global	 approach	 to	 migration:	 Priority	 actions	
focussing	on	Africa	and	the	Mediterranean"	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2005).	This	included	



















security,	 vehicles	 and	 small	 boats	 “anomalous	 behaviours	 and	 biometrics.	 SOBCAH	 lasted	 18	
months	and	 the	Commission	 supported	 the	project	with	€2.010.600	out	of	€3.007.109.	 It	was	
coordinated	 by	 the	 Finmeccanica	 (now	 Leonardo)	 subsidiary,	 Galileo	 Avionica,	 and	 partners	
included	 SELEX	 Sensors	 and	 Airborne	 Systems,	 SELEX	 SI,	 Hellenic	 Aerospace	 Industry,	 Thales	
Research	&	Technology,	Thales	Underwater	Systems,	Rheinmetall,	Indra	Sistemas,	as	well	as	The	
Netherlands	 Organization	 for	 Applied	 Scientific	 Research	 and	 Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft	 zur	
Förderung	der	angewandten	Forschung	(Preparatory	Action	for	Security	Research,	2006,	p.58).	
Frontex	also	carried	out	the	BORTEC	study	on	a	EU	Border	Surveillance	System,	which	was	













management	 of	 the	 EU’s	 southern	 maritime	 borders.	 Soon	 thereafter,	 the	 European	 Council	
confirmed	the	priority	of	creating	such	a	European	Surveillance	System.	
Then,	 in	 2007	 Decision	 No.574/2007/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	
meant	the	adoption	of	new	strategic	guidelines	for	the	External	Borders	Fund	between	2007-2013.	
These	new	strategic	priorities	were	beneficial	for	industrial	actors	as	the	decision	emphasized	the	
need	 for	 “support	 for	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 national	 components	 of	 a	
European	Surveillance	System	for	the	external	borders”	through	the	External	Borders	Fund,	and	
for	the	creation	of	a	permanent	European	Patrol	Network	at	the	EU’s	southern	maritime	borders.	
The	Decision	also	noted	 that	 for	 such	projects,	 the	 financial	Community	contribution	could	be	
increased	 to	 75%	 for	 certain	 priorities,	 like	 investments	 in	 establishing	 or	 upgrading	 national	
coordination	centres;	national	surveillance	systems;	and	“for	the	purchase	and/or	upgrading	of	




through	 national	 coordination	 centres	 (NCCs),	 a	 EUROSUR	 communication	 network	 and	
collaboration	with	third	countries.	Phase	2	then	planned	the	development	of	common	tools	for	
border	 surveillance	 at	 EU	 level	 through	 research	 and	 development	 projects,	 the	 common	
application	 of	 surveillance	 tools	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 common	 pre-frontier	 intelligence	
picture.	Phase	3	then	involved	setting	up	a	common	information	sharing	environment	(CISE)	for	








Also	 in	 2008,	 and	 following	 the	 path	 developed	 through	 the	 CIVIPOL,	 MEDSEA	 and	 BORTEC	
studies,	the	EU's	Directorate	General	for	Justice,	Freedom	and	Security	called	for	a	technical	study	
to	be	completed	in	2013.	This	was	for	a	system	providing	full	situational	awareness	of	cross-border	





















information	 sharing,	 coordination	 and	 exchange	 of	
situational	 pictures.	 When	 it	 came	 to	 the	 more	 specific	
planning	 of	 border	 equipment,	 the	 ESG-study	 had	 the	
appearance	of	a	general	and	vast	procurement	list	for	the	
Commission	 and	 the	 Member	 States.	 Thus,	 33	
“phenotypical”	 border	 segments	 were	 identified	 and	
technical	 cost	estimates	 for	establishing	or	upgrading	 the	
technological	infrastructure	were	given.	This	list,	however,	
encountered	 dissatisfaction	 in	 the	 EUROSUR	 Member	
States'	 expert	 group,	 where	 appointed	 national	 experts	
contested	it.	It	was	argued	that	the	technical	concepts	were	
underdeveloped	 and	 not	 specific	 enough	 as	 binding	
technical	 requirements.	 What	 followed	 would	 be	 a	
diffusion	 into	parallel	 streams.	One	where	 Frontex	would	
take	 over	 contractual	 responsibility	 for	 EUROSUR’s	
framework	 contracts,	 and	 another	 where	 the	 continued	
research	and	development	into	the	infrastructure	would	be	






known	 as	 EUROSUR	 were	 connected	 to	 Commission’s	
launch	of	the	FP7	(between	2007-2013)	and	Horizon	2020	




As	 was	 also	 the	 case	 with	 the	 drive	 towards	





the	 annual	 work	 programmes.	 Accordingly,	 the	 drive	
towards	a	space-based	surveillance	network	for	 land	and	
maritime	 borders	 can	 also	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 both	 the	
Advisory	 Group	 on	 Secutiry,	 SecAG,	 and	 the	 Advisory	
Group	 for	 Space,	 SAG,	 guiding	 Commission	 and	 the	
Proogramme	Committee	on	the	priorities	of	 the	FP7	and	
Horizon	2020	work	programmes.	
Like	 SecAG,	 	 SAG	 also	 featured	 several	members	
with	ongoing	or	past	ties	to	the	European	aerospace	and	
defence	 industry.	 In	 a	 preliminary	 2011-report	 sketching	
priorities	 for	 the	 future	 Horizon	 2020	 programme,	 SAG	
noted	that	“European	space	budgets	have	stagnated”,	that	
Horizon	 2020	 “must	 support	 the	 competitiveness	 of	
European	industry”.	Moreover,	it	framed	as	a	problem	“an	
unfortunately	 fragmented	 European	 institutional	 market	







views	 on	 the	 use	 of	 space	 for	 the	 security	 of	 European	
citizens,	 noting	 that	 earth	observation	 alongside	 satellite	
communications	 and	 navigation	 can	 be	 used	 to	monitor	
humanitarian	sitautions,	borders,	movements	and	changes	
that	 could	 threaten	 national	 civil	 security.”	 (European	
Commission,	 2012c,	 20,	 26).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 also	
reiterated	 earlier	 comments	 that	 the	 many	 funds	




billion	 was	 allocated	 to	 the	 Security	 theme.	 Both	 of	 these	 instruments	 were	 used	 to	 build	
EUROSUR	in	accordance	with	the	2008	EUROSUR	Roadmap.	Overall,	the	company	GMV	turned	
out	to	be	one	of	the	main	beneficiaries	of	such	research	and	development	funds,	and	thus	also	









Programme”;	 “SEC-2012.3.1-1	 Increasing	 trustworthiness	 of	 vessel	 reporting	 system”;	 “SEC-
2012.3.5-1	 Development	 of	 airborne	 sensors	 and	 data	 link	 –	 integration	 project”	 and	 “SEC-
2012.3.1-2	Pre-Operational	Validation	 (POV)	at	EU	 level	of	 common	application	of	 surveillance	
tools”.	 These	 were	 then	 to	 evolve	 onwards	 into	 a	 Common	 Information	 Sharing	 Environment	
(CISE).	





Two	 of	 the	 projects	 granted	 funds	 under	 this	 topic	 were	 the	 Autonomous	 maritime	
surveillance	 system	 (AMASS),	 and	 the	 Wide	 maritime	 area	 airborne	 surveillance	 (WIMAAS)	
projects.	AMASS,	running	between	2008-2011,	was	granted	€3.450.460	out	of	an	overall	budget	
of	 €5.465.308.	 It	 was	 coordinated	 by	 Carl	 Zeiss	 Optronics	 from	 Germany,	 and,	 among	 others	
included	 Spanish	 research	 and	 education	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 of	 Malta.	
WIMAAS,	 also	 running	 between	 2008-2011,	 was	 granted	 €2.737.169	 out	 of	 €4.001.123,	
coordinated	 by	 French	 Thales,	 and	 included	 the	 Finmeccanica	 subsidiary	 Selex	Galileo,	 French	
Dassualt	 Aviation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 university	 of	 Malta	 and	 Spanish	 engineering	 and	 aviation	
companies.	






Maritime	 Security	 Awareness	 by	 addressing	 the	 insufficient	 interoperability	 of	 European	 and	
national	 assets.”	 (Cordis,	 OPERAMAR).	 OPERAMAR	 lasted	 from	 2008-2009,	 and	 was	 granted	
€669.132	 out	 of	 €669.134	 -	 having	 to	 pay	 €2	 itself.	 It	was	 coordinated	 by	 Thales	 Underwater	
Systems	and	also	included	Finmeccanica	subsidiary	Selex	SI,	Indra,	the	Joint	Research	Centre	of	
the	European	Commission,	as	well	as	Thales	Systemes	Aeroportes.	
Similarly,	 the	 2010	 Cooperation	 Work	 Programme	 for	 Space	 formulated	 the	 topic	
“SPA.2010.1.1-05	 -	 Contributing	 to	 the	 “S”	 in	 GMES	 –	 Developing	 pre-operational	 service	







that	 “the	 development	 of	 further	 monitoring	 capabilities	 from	 space	 is	 needed,	 for	 example	
overcoming	 constraints	 in	 relation	 to	 new	 surveillance	 and	 tracking	 technologies	 such	 as	 the	
detection	of	small	boats	used	for	illegal	migration	and	related	cross-border	crime	by	using	satellite	





Three	 consortiums	 used	 to	 test	 and	 evolve	 the	 plans	 for	 a	 space-based	 surveillance	
network	were	granted	funds	under	this	topic.	These	were	namely	Development	of	Pre-operational	
Services	for	Highly	Innovative	Maritime	Surveillance	Capabilities	(DOLPHIN),	Simulator	for	Moving	





Projects	 like	 PERSEUS,	 AMASS,	WIMAAS,	OPERAMAR	 and	NEREIDS	 illustrates	 how	 the	
border	governance	of	the	EU	has	been	shaped	continuously	by	multileved	governance	realized	




















a	 €1,5	 million	 contract	 for	 a	 pilot	 project	 testing	
Eurosur	between	Frontex	and	selected	Member	States,	





That	 same	 year,	 the	 company	 issued	 a	 press	 release	
saying	that	“the	EUROSUR	project	fits	in	perfectly	with	
GMV's	 ongoing	 strategy	 of	 internationalizing	 its	
defense	 and	 seurity	 activities	 and	 consolidates	 its	
leadership	 within	 European	 border	 surveillance	
activities”	(GMV,	2012).		
After	 the	European	Parliament	had	approved	
the	 EUROSUR	 package	 in	 2013,	 more	 contracts	
followed;	 In	 2013	 came	 a	 €1756.895	 contract	 for	




EUROSUR	 the	 “the	 brain	 child”	 of	 Frontex	 (a	
description	 bypassing	 the	 CIVIPOL	 study	 in	 2003),	
celebrated	 that	 the	 European	 Parliament	 had	 “taken	
in”	the	system	developed	by	GMV,	and	noted	that	GMV	
would	 now	 assume	 responsibility	 for	 “execution,	









€1.264.264	 and	 €2.042.403.	 Similarly,	 in	 2016	 and	 2017,	 the	 company	was	 awarded	 contracts	
worth	 €2.597.863	 and	 €1.744.950	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 and	 delivery	 of	 goods	 during	
maintainance	and	development	of	the	EUROSUR	network,	and	in	2018	a	similar	contract	worth	
€889.863.	 Moreover,	 the	 close	 relations	 to	 Frontex	 were	 also	 lucrative	 for	 GMV	 outside	 the	
EUROSUR	context,	as	the	company	was	also	awarded	an	increasing	number	of	other	contracts,	



















the	AGs.	This	 is	 illustrated	by	the	Marine-EO	consortium	shown	 in	Figure	27.	Derived	from	the	
topic	“EO-2-2016	–	Downstream	services	for	public	authorities”,	it	teamed	up	an	“end	user	group”	
consisting	of	 five	maritime	authorities	and	 four	 research	organizations	 from	Member	States	 in	
order	 to	develop,	 test	 and	 validate	 services	 covering	marine	monitoring	 and	 security,	 propose	
support	 sets	 to	 integrate	 these	 services	 into	 operations,	 and	 strengthen	 transnational	
collaboration	in	maritime	awareness	and	surveillance.	As	a	project	objective,	it	notes	that	“Pre-
Commercial	Procurement	is	a	powerful	tools	to	tackle	these	three	points”	
Yet,	 while	 the	 EUROSUR	 project	might	 be	 tailored	 by	 a	mushrooming	 border	 security	
market,	 its	 costs	 have	 long	 been	 problematized,	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	 interoperable	 EU	
information	systems.	In	fact,	one	year	before	it	was	launched,	an	influential	study	raised	concerns,	



















plans	are	shared	with	 third	countries	 is	 left	at	 the	discretion	of	Member	States	 (Ibid.,	p.	48)	 is	
contradicted	 by	 the	 operating	 rules	 of	 EUROSUR	 as	 they	 were	 approved	 by	 the	 European	
Parliament	 in	 2013,	 namely	 that	 Member	 States	 “states	 must	 not	 use	 Eurosur	 to	 send	 third	
countries	any	information	that	could	be	used	to	identify	a	person	whose	request	for	international	
protection	 is	 being	 processed	 or	 whose	 life	 or	 physical	 integrity	 could	 be	 at	 risk”	 (European	
Parliament,	2013a).	
	







the	 EU	 Commission	 of	 €3,24mia	 for	 2014-2021,	 a	 budget	 increased	 to	 €5,8	 billion	 by	 the	
Parliament	 in	 April	 2019	 (Copernicus,	 2018;	 Space	 News,	 2019).	 Out	 of	 this,	 €500	 million	 is	
earmarked	 for	 security	purposes,	 such	as	border	protection,	 civil	 protection	and	humanitarian	
interventions,	 through	 the	 Space	 and	 Situational	 Awareness	 (SSA)	 programme	 and	 the	 new	











common	 security	 and	 defence	 policy”	 including	 areas	 such	 as	 “external	 action,	 border	
management,	 maritime	 security,	 disaster	 management,	 humanitarian	 aid	 and	 transport”	
(Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs,	2015,	p.	5).	
In	 2018,	 in	 a	 European	 Commission	 proposal	 to	 regulate	 Frontex,	 the	 provision	 of	
Copernicus	data	to	generate	EUROSUR	Fusion	Services	was	suggested.	These	were	to	be	expanded	
to	support	checks	at	Border	Crossing	Points,	Air	Border	Surveillance	and	monitoring	of	migration	
flows	 and	 also	 to	 “significantly	 step	 up	 the	 effective	 return	 of	 irregular	 migrants”	 (European	
Commission,	2018f,	p.	27).	However,	illustrating	the	discursive	slide	between	framing	migrants	as	
a	risk	and	at	risk	that	characterizes	the	ongoing	“humanitarianization	of	border	control”	(Lemberg-







The	 volume	 of	 projected	 investment	 has	 attracted	 attention	 from	 the	 aerospace	 and	
defence	industry;	this	has	also	been	observable	in	the	European	Parliament’s	discussions.	Many	








Aerospace	and	Defence	won	contracts	 for	€9	 in	Spain	and	Germany.	Moreover,	Telespazio,	 the	






















GMV	 has	 been	 a	 big	 beneficiary	 of	 the	 EUROSUR	 evolution	 and	 Pre-Commercial	
Procurement	 strategy,	 involving	 pro-actively	 shaping	 the	 EU	 research	 environment	 in	 order	 to	
receive	 subsidies	under	both	 FP7	and	Horizon	2020.	And	 in	 general,	 Frontex’s	 relations	 to	 the	
aerospace	and	defence	industry	and	the	management	of	contracts	pertaining	to	EUROSUR	exhibits	
similar	 tendencies	of	 capture,	 path	dependency	and	 lock-in	 effects	 as	 EU-Lisa.	However,	while	
massive	investments	are	desired	by	industrial	actors,	civil	society	and	parliamentary	circles	have	
been	more	skeptical,	taking	issue	with	opaque	estimates	and	costs	for	the	“system	of	systems”.	



















with	which	 they	 collaborate	on	developing	border	 surveillance	 systems,	 attempt	 to	 assess	 the	
necessity	 of	 these	 measures,	 but	 rather	 repeatedly	 opt	 for	 more	 expansive	 and	 open-ended	
evolutions	of	the	systems.	This	makes	it	close	to	impossible	to	follow	the	four	steps	stipulated	by	
the	 EDPS	 for	 assessing	 necessity,	 namely:	 Factual	 descriptions	 of	 the	measure;	 identifying	 the	
fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	limited	by	the	data	measure;	defining	the	object	of	the	measure,	
and	 establishing	 the	 most	 officient	 and	 least	 intrusive	 option	 (EDPS	 2019).	 Similarly,	 the	
development	of	border	surveillance	also	sidesteps	the	four	steps	stipulated	by	the	EDPS	regarding	
the	assessment	of	proportionality,	namely:	The	importance	of	the	objective	and	whether	it	is	met;	








private	 companies	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 analyzing	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 border	 control	 (see	
however	 Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013;	 Kumar,	 2017).	 EU	 subsidies	 for	 research	 and	 development	
certainly	represent	important	and	vied-for	pre-commercial	infusions	of	capital	for	actors	on	the	
market	 for	EU	border	control.	But	although	such	a	 focus	 is	 therefore	crucial	 for	examining	 the	
political	 economy	 of	 multileveled	 EU	 border	 governance,	 it	 is	 incomplete	 unless	 the	 scale	 of	
inquiry	is	elevated	to	include	the	financial	sector	as	well.	These	actors	include	the	banking	sector,	
investment	 firms,	 European	 financial	 institutions,	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	
















































































































Observing	 the	 share	 ownership	 across	 the	 ten	 companies	 represented	 in	 Tables	 5-14,	
certain	patterns	stand	out;	namely	the	involvement	of	certain	actors	across	multiple	companies	
and	sectors	of	border	control.	Notably,	a	company	like	GMV	is	not	publicly	listed,	but	wholly	owned	
by	 private	 capital.	 Representing	 	 free-floating	 private	 equity,	 the	 Vanguard	 Group	 is	 the	 top	
shareholder	of	3M,	HP,	IBM	and	Accenture,	while	also	owning	smaller	portions	of	shares	in	Airbus,	
Leonardo,	Thales,	Safran	and	Atos.	Through	its	ownership,	the	Vanguard	Group	thus	dominate	a	
number	 of	 companies,	 which	 have	 been	 central	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 EU	 databases	
controlling	borders,	whilst	also	exercising	lesser	influence	on	the	companies	involved	in	EUROSUR.	







































Through	 government-controlled	 funds	 and	 companies,	 EU	 Member	 States	 are	 also	
strategically	involved	in	the	ownership	of	certain	companies.	Thus,	on	the	4-5	of	December	2019,	
Norges	 Bank	 Investment	Management,	 the	 asset	 management	 unit	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 central	
bank,	 owned	 shares	 in	 both	 Indra,	 IBM	 and	 Atos,	 and	 was	 in	 fact	 the	 third	 largest	 owner	 of	
Leonardo,	 after	 the	 states	 of	 Italy	 and	 Libya.	 The	 Italian	 Ministry	 of	 Economy	 and	 Finance,	
however,	 remains	 the	 largest	 shareholder,	 owning	 30,2%	 of	 the	 company.	 Similarly,	 the	 vast	
majority	of	the	controlling	interests	behind	Airbus	were	held	by,	respectively,	Societé	de	Gestion	









This	 is	 an	 important	 financial	 backdrop	 for	 understanding	 the	 complex	 processes	 and	
conflicts	 constantly	 evolving	 at	 the	 level	 of	 technological	 development,	 recommendations	 of	
national	experts	and	spiralling	contracts	observable	in	both	the	databases	and	EUROSUR	policy	
drives.	Moreover,	state-ownership	also	represents	an	additional	level	of	strategy,	when	it	comes	















































The	EiB	 loans	are	driven	forward	by	the	discourses	of	 fighting	“market	 fragmentation”	and	the	





the	capital-intensive	character	of	 this	policy	drive	and	the	crucial	 strategic	 role	of	 the	 financial	
sector	for	these	commercial	actors.	
	 Moving	from	EU	instruments	to	the	commercial	financial	sector,	more	actors	are	involved	
in	 the	 financing	of	 the	operations,	R&D	and	contracts	of	 the	 largest	border	 industrial	actors	 in	
Europe.	 Most	 of	 the	 companies	 involved	 in	 EU	 border	 control	 infrastructures	 operate	 with	





Finmeccanica	 2009 500.000.000 Aviation	R&D
Safran 2009 300.000.000 Aircraft	R&D
EADS	 2011 500.000.000 Aviation	R&D
Airbus	 2015 500.000.000 Aerospace	R&D
Indra 2016 80.000.000 RadarR&D
Leonardo 2018 299.999.991 Cybersecurity	R&D
Ariane 2020 200.000.000 Aerospace	R&D
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Morgan,	while	HP	 recently	 renewed	 their	 revolving	 credit	of	 $4.75	billion,	 co-ordinated	by	 J.P.	
Morgan	and	Citibank.	
7.2	Controversies	and	criticism			
Examining	 the	 financial	 dimension	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 underpinning	 EU	 border	 control	
provides	important	insights	into	the	multileveled	processes	shaping	the	material	infrastructure	of	








of	 military	 technology,	 are	 increasingly	 also	 being	 transferred	 to	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 EU	
borders.		







While	these	span	 institutional	and	private,	national	and	global	 financial	and	strategic	 interests,	








has	 discussed	 the	 conjunction	 between	 EU	 institutions	 and	 private	 actors	 from	 the	 European	
security	and	defence	sector.	The	cases	of	interoperable	EU	databases,	like	Eurodac,	VIS,	SIS	and	
EES,	 and	 the	 space-based,	 networked	 surveillance	 pursued	 under	 the	 EURUSOUR	 project,	




priorities	 for	 EU’s	 border	 infrastructures	 has	 served	 to	 accelerate	 the	 securitization	 and	
militarization	 of	 the	 associated	 European	 border	 control.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 the	 mobility	
governance	 of	 the	 EU	 is	 increasingly	 evolving	 into	 a	 market	 for	 border	 control	 services	 and	
products	along	premises	co-shaped	by	the	largest	market	actors	themselves.	They	both	position	
themselves,	and	are	being	positioned,	as	unrivalled	experts.	But	this	connects	border	control	to	








European	 industrial	 competitiveness	 vis	 a	 vis	 Asia	 and	 America	 appear	 abstracted	 from	 and	
omitting	the	violent	and	politically	contested	character	that	has	surrounded	EU	border	control	in	
the	 last	 decades.	 The	 coinciding	 roll-out	 of	 border	 control	 interventions	 and	 their	 associated	
technological	 infrastructure	with	 the	 tragic,	periluous	and	 life-threatening	migration	 routes	 for	
third	 country	 nationals	 into	 the	 EU	 is	worrying	 and	 rarely	 if	 ever	 addressed	 in	 the	myriads	 of	
reports,	 meeting	 minutes,	 contracts,	 topics,	 consortium	 objectives	 or	 company	 profiles	 and	
webpages	examined	for	this	report.	
	 Various	 lobbying	 strategies	 and	 forums	 are	 deployed	 by	 actors	 on	 the	 market	 for	 EU	





Platforms	 are	 but	 some	 examples.	 Policies	 also	 evolve	 through	 a	 plethora	 of	 lucheons,	 talks,	









strategy,	planning,	advisory	 input	and	technical	expertise,	but	also	as	product	suppliers	 for	 the	
«	end	users	»,	 that	 is	 the	EU	or	national	 agencies	 and	bodies	 tasked	with	border	 control.	 The	
different	levels	on	which	vested	interests	affect	policy-making	on	EU	borders	is	further	illustrated	
when	considering	the	financial	dynamics	underpinning	the	conglomerate	actors	involved	in	border	




of	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 democratic	 transparency,	 the	 report	 details	 how	 this	 development	
leads	to	 technological	and	political	 lock-in	effects.	These	make	 it	diffulcult	 for	policy-makers	 to	
question	or	reverse	the	functionality	of	the	EU	borders	as	well	as	the	norms	embedded	within	
infrastructures	 such	 as	 the	 VIS,	 SIS,	 EES	 or	 EUROSUR	 systems.	 These	 dynamics	 pose	 serious	
challenges	not	just	to	the	democratic	legitimacy	and	transparency	of	the	EU’s	multileved	border	
governance,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 balance	 struck	 between	 short-sighted,	 vested	 interests,	 and	 the	
forward-looking,	long-term	ambitions	in	European	Union	migration	politics.	
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